First Vagabonds Church Of God v. City Of Orlando
638 F.3d 756, 2011 WL 1366778, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7448 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance that limits the number of large group feedings in centrally located public parks is a valid content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction and a reasonable regulation of expressive conduct under the First Amendment, provided it serves a substantial government interest, is unrelated to the suppression of expression, and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.
Facts:
- Lake Eola Park, located in the heart of downtown Orlando, Florida, is the signature park of the City and is one of 42 parks in the Greater Downtown Park District, which is within a two-mile radius of City Hall. Orlando has 108 parks in total.
- In 2005, Orlando Food Not Bombs, a group of political activists, began distributing free food at Lake Eola Park every Wednesday at 5:00 p.m.
- First Vagabonds Church of God, a religious organization, also began conducting weekly services that included group feedings at Lake Eola Park, later moving its services to Langford Park, which is also in the Greater Downtown Park District.
- In 2008, Orlando Food Not Bombs added a second weekly feeding at Lake Eola Park on Mondays at 8:00 a.m. The free feedings ordinarily attracted between 50 and 120 people.
- Residents of the neighborhoods surrounding Lake Eola Park complained to the City about the conduct of people who disbursed into the neighborhoods after the feeding events.
- In response to these complaints, the City held public hearings and enacted an ordinance to regulate feedings of large groups at central public parks.
- The ordinance defined a 'large group feeding' as an event attracting 25 or more people for food delivery/service and required permits for such events within the Greater Downtown Park District, limiting any permitee to two permits a year for any one park in that district.
- Orlando Mayor John Hugh Dyer Jr. and other city officials testified that the ordinance was enacted to "be fair to individual neighborhoods" by distributing the large group feedings among the various city parks and to make burdens on public parks more manageable.
Procedural Posture:
- Orlando Food Not Bombs and four of its members, along with First Vagabonds Church of God and its pastor, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the City of Orlando, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and granted summary judgment against the facial challenge under the Free Speech Clause.
- After a two-day bench trial, the district court granted a motion by the City for judgment on partial findings (Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c)) on the claims of the Church under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
- The district court then entered a written judgment, ruling in favor of the Church on its claim under the Free Exercise Clause, in favor of Orlando Food Not Bombs on its as-applied claim under the Free Speech Clause, and in favor of the City on the claim under the Free Assembly Clause.
- The district court permanently enjoined the City from enforcing the ordinance.
- The City (as appellant) appealed the ruling against it concerning the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, while Orlando Food Not Bombs and the Church (as cross-appellants/appellees) appealed the rulings against them, with the exception of the Free Assembly claim which was abandoned.
- A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the injunction, reversing the judgment in favor of Orlando Food Not Bombs and the Church on the claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, and affirming the judgment in favor of the City on other claims.
- Orlando Food Not Bombs filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted, vacating the panel opinion and directing Orlando Food Not Bombs and the City to brief one issue: whether the ordinance as applied to Orlando Food Not Bombs violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance limiting the number of large group feedings in centrally located parks violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when applied to an organization engaged in expressive conduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Pryor, Circuit Judge
No, a municipal ordinance limiting the number of large group feedings in centrally located parks does not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when applied to an organization engaged in expressive conduct, because it constitutes a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction and a reasonable regulation of expressive conduct. The court assumed, without deciding, that the feeding of homeless persons by Orlando Food Not Bombs was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, but found the ordinance permissible under the framework established in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. The ordinance restricts feedings less than the regulation upheld in Clark, allowing Orlando Food Not Bombs to obtain two permits a year for each of the 42 parks in the Greater Downtown Parks District (84 total feedings annually in that zone) and placing no restrictions on feedings in the 66 parks outside this district. This leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, as the organization can still conduct other expressive activities at Lake Eola Park and unrestricted feedings elsewhere. The ordinance is content-neutral and narrowly furthers the City's substantial interest in managing its parks and distributing the burden of large group feedings to be "fair to individual neighborhoods." The court also found the ordinance to be a valid regulation of expressive conduct that satisfies all four requirements of the United States v. O’Brien test: (1) it is within the City's power to regulate park usage; (2) the City has a substantial interest in managing park property and spreading the burden, which the ordinance serves; (3) this interest is unrelated to suppressing speech; and (4) the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary. The court emphasized that the judiciary should not "replace the [City] as the manager of [its] parks" or substitute its judgment for the City's regarding park management, as established in Clark and United States v. Albertini.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions and regulations of expressive conduct in public forums. It demonstrates that governmental bodies have substantial discretion to manage public spaces, even when expressive activities are involved, provided the restrictions are narrowly tailored to a substantial government interest, are not aimed at suppressing speech, and leave open alternative avenues for communication. The decision highlights the judiciary's deference to governmental entities in determining the most effective methods for achieving legitimate government interests, preventing courts from acting as 'super managers' of public resources. This could impact future cases by upholding similar municipal ordinances that seek to distribute the impact of public events across various locations, even if they incidentally limit the frequency of expressive conduct at specific popular venues.
