Finger v. State
27 P.3d 66, 117 Nev. 548, 117 Nev. Adv. Rep. 48 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A state legislature cannot constitutionally abolish the insanity defense, as the ability of a defendant to argue they lacked the requisite criminal intent (mens rea) due to insanity is a fundamental principle protected by the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions.
Facts:
- Frederick Finger had an extensive, multi-decade history of severe mental illness, including diagnoses of schizophrenia, manic depressive disorder with homicidal tendencies, and paranoia, for which he had been institutionalized several times.
- In the early morning of April 10, 1996, a neighbor was awakened by a woman screaming.
- Shortly thereafter, Finger, covered in blood, pounded on the neighbor's door, shouting that someone had killed his mother, Franziska Brassaw.
- When police arrived, they discovered Brassaw dead on her kitchen floor from a stab wound to the head.
- Police found a bloody kitchen knife in a nearby yard where another neighbor had observed Finger mumbling to himself.
- Finger initially told police that his roommate, Jose Rivera, had killed his mother.
- Finger later admitted to stabbing his mother, explaining he did so because he suffered from a delusion that she was plotting to kill him and he had to kill her first.
Procedural Posture:
- Frederick Finger was charged with one count of open murder in a Nevada district court (trial court).
- At his arraignment, Finger sought to enter a plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity'.
- The district court denied the request, citing a 1995 state law that abolished that plea.
- Finger then entered a plea of 'guilty but mentally ill' to a charge of second-degree murder.
- Based on the plea, the district court convicted Finger and sentenced him to life in prison.
- Finger appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Nevada, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a state statutory scheme that abolishes the affirmative defense of legal insanity and replaces it with a 'guilty but mentally ill' plea violate the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Becker, J.
Yes. The statutory scheme violates the due process clauses because it permits an individual to be convicted of a criminal offense without possessing the requisite criminal intent. It is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence, protected by due process, that a defendant who is incapable of forming the required mens rea cannot be convicted of a crime. Legal insanity is a corollary of mens rea, as it represents a complete defense based on the defendant's inability to form criminal intent. The M'Naghten rule, which Nevada follows, requires that a defendant appreciate the wrongfulness of their act, an element tied to the concept of malice in crimes like murder. By abolishing the insanity defense, the legislature's 'mens rea model' unconstitutionally allows for the conviction of an individual who, due to a delusion, could not appreciate their act's wrongfulness and therefore could not form the necessary malicious intent.
Dissenting - Shearing, J.
No. The Nevada statutory scheme is constitutional because it does not eliminate the requirement that the State prove the defendant's mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the new statutes, evidence of insanity may still be presented to negate the element of intent ('purpose, motive or intent'), and other statutes require the State to prove a 'union, or joint operation of act and intention.' The choice of a specific test for legal sanity is a matter of state policy, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never mandated a single constitutional test, historically deferring to the states. The legislature acted within its authority to modernize the law and move away from the outdated M'Naghten test, and the majority should have construed the statutes in a constitutional manner rather than striking them down.
Concurring - Leavitt, J.
Yes. The statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it deprives a defendant of liberty without due process of law. It forces a mentally ill defendant, who may not be competent to do so, to enter a guilty plea and waive fundamental constitutional rights. The procedure effectively criminalizes mental illness by imprisoning individuals who may be incapable of forming the intent necessary to commit a crime, which also constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the insanity defense is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, intrinsically linked to the mens rea requirement for a criminal conviction. It serves as a significant check on legislative efforts to abolish the insanity defense, a trend that emerged in some states following the Hinckley verdict. The court's holding solidifies the M'Naghten rule in Nevada and clarifies its application, particularly in cases involving delusions, by requiring that the delusional facts, if true, must constitute a legal justification for the defendant's actions. This precedent will guide future legislative reforms and judicial analyses concerning the constitutional limits of defining criminal responsibility for mentally ill defendants.
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