Filarsky v. Delia
2012 U.S. LEXIS 3105, 182 L. Ed. 2d 662, 566 U.S. 377 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An individual temporarily retained by the government to perform government duties is entitled to seek qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the same extent as a permanent public employee.
Facts:
- Nicholas Delia, a firefighter for the City of Rialto, took three weeks of sick leave after responding to a toxic spill.
- The City became suspicious of Delia's extended absence and hired a private investigation firm, which observed Delia purchasing building supplies.
- Believing Delia was using sick leave to work on his home, the City hired Steve Filarsky, a private attorney, to conduct an internal affairs investigation.
- During an interview with Delia, Filarsky questioned him about the building supplies.
- After Delia denied doing construction, Filarsky, with the Fire Chief's approval, sought to verify his claim by viewing the materials.
- When Delia refused to consent to a search of his home, Filarsky, acting on behalf of the City, ordered him to bring the building materials out of his house and onto his lawn for inspection.
- Fire Chief Stephen Wells signed the formal order prepared by Filarsky.
- Under threat of discipline for insubordination, Delia complied and brought the insulation rolls out of his house for the officials to see.
Procedural Posture:
- Nicholas Delia sued Steve Filarsky, the City of Rialto, and several city officials in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The District Court (trial court) granted summary judgment to all individual defendants, including Filarsky, concluding they were protected by qualified immunity.
- Delia appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the judgment for the city employee defendants but reversed the judgment for Filarsky.
- The Ninth Circuit held that Filarsky, as a private attorney and not a city employee, was not entitled to seek qualified immunity.
- Filarsky petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a private individual temporarily retained by a public entity to carry out government work forfeit the ability to seek qualified immunity from a § 1983 lawsuit simply because they are not a permanent government employee?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No, a private individual temporarily retained by the government does not forfeit the ability to seek qualified immunity solely based on their employment status. An individual working for the government is eligible for qualified immunity regardless of whether they do so as a full-time employee or on some other basis. The Court's reasoning is grounded in the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, which did not distinguish between public servants and private individuals engaged in public service when affording protection. The policy goals of immunity—avoiding 'unwarranted timidity,' attracting talented candidates (especially those with specialized skills), and preventing the distractions of litigation—apply equally to both permanent employees and temporary contractors. This case is distinguishable from Richardson v. McKnight, which involved privately employed guards in a for-profit prison system, and Wyatt v. Cole, which involved private individuals using state procedures for purely private ends.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, Filarsky is eligible for qualified immunity, but this does not end the inquiry. Justice Ginsburg concurs that Filarsky's status as a private attorney does not categorically bar him from seeking qualified immunity. However, she writes separately to emphasize that on remand, the lower court must still determine whether Filarsky's specific conduct violated a 'clearly established' constitutional right. She strongly suggests that ordering an employee, under threat of termination, to retrieve property from his home to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement may indeed be a violation of such a right.
Concurring - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, Filarsky's employment status is not a sound basis on which to deny him immunity in this context. Justice Sotomayor concurs but writes to clarify that not every private individual working for the government will necessarily be entitled to claim qualified immunity. The standard immunity analysis still applies. In this case, immunity is appropriate because Filarsky worked in close coordination with and alongside immune government employees. The ruling should not be read to automatically grant immunity to all private actors; future cases involving individuals in different roles, such as those hired for their independence, should be decided as they arise.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of qualified immunity by rejecting a formalistic distinction based on employment status. It confirms that the protections of qualified immunity extend to private individuals who are functionally acting as government agents, ensuring that governments can hire outside experts without exposing them to greater liability than permanent employees. The ruling strengthens the position of private contractors sued under § 1983, allowing them to invoke the same powerful defense available to their public-sector counterparts. Consequently, it may become more difficult for plaintiffs to hold private individuals performing government work accountable for constitutional violations.
