Fields v. Henrich
2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1909, 208 S.W.3d 353, 2006 WL 3716032 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A landowner is not liable for harm to a very young trespassing child caused by an artificial condition on the land, such as a pond, unless the landowner knows or has reason to know that children too young to appreciate the danger are likely to trespass on the property.
Facts:
- Norbert and Sharon Henrich lived on an eight-acre residential lot which contained a single-family residence.
- In the front yard of their property was an unfenced sewage aeration pond measuring approximately thirty feet by twenty-five feet and four feet deep.
- Mr. Henrich had removed a dilapidated fence from around the pond in 1996 and had purchased materials to build a new one but had not yet done so.
- On May 16, 1998, two-year-old Melvin Michael Fields II was attending a party at the home of the Henriches' neighbor.
- Michael wandered from the neighbor's property onto the Henriches' property and was found in the aeration pond.
- Michael died four days later as a result of near drowning.
- There was no evidence that young children had ever trespassed on the Henriches' property, and the youngest child living in the immediate area was nine years old.
Procedural Posture:
- Melvin Michael Fields and Christine Wardlow (Plaintiffs) sued Norbert and Sharon Henrich (Defendants) for wrongful death in a Missouri trial court.
- An initial trial resulted in a verdict for Plaintiffs, but the court granted a new trial on all issues.
- Defendants' appeal of the new trial order was dismissed by the intermediate appellate court.
- The case was retried, and at the close of evidence, Defendants' motions for a directed verdict were denied.
- The trial court instructed the jury on a gross negligence standard under the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA), and the jury returned a verdict for the Defendants.
- The trial court then granted the Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, concluding that it had erred in applying the RUA.
- The Defendants (Appellants) appealed the order granting the new trial to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
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Issue:
Does a landowner have a duty to safeguard an artificial pond from a very young trespassing child if the landowner has no reason to know that children of that age are likely to trespass on the property?
Opinions:
Majority - Ulrich, J.
No. A landowner does not have a duty to safeguard an artificial condition from a very young trespassing child unless it was foreseeable that such children were likely to trespass. First, the court determined that the Missouri Recreational Land Use Act (RUA), which provides landowners immunity from simple negligence claims, did not apply because the Henriches' property was a private residence and not land opened for public recreational use. The court then analyzed the case under the modified attractive nuisance doctrine as articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339. While ponds are typically considered open and obvious dangers for which landowners owe no duty to child trespassers, an exception exists for children too young to appreciate the risk. However, for this exception to trigger liability, the plaintiff must satisfy all five elements of § 339, including that 'the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass.' Here, the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that the Henriches knew or should have known that toddlers were likely to enter their property and approach the pond. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to make a submissible case for negligence.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical importance of foreseeability in premises liability cases involving child trespassers. It clarifies that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, the landowner's duty is not triggered solely by the presence of a dangerous artificial condition and the tragic injury of a child too young to appreciate the risk. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the landowner had specific knowledge or a reason to know that children of that age were likely to trespass in the specific area of the hazard. This ruling sets a significant evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs, preventing the doctrine from imposing a strict liability standard on landowners and requiring a tangible link between the landowner's awareness and the likelihood of a child's presence.
