Fielding v. State
238 Md. App. 262, 189 A.3d 871 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
The District Court of Maryland retains exclusive original jurisdiction over vehicle law violations, even when the State seeks enhanced penalties for a subsequent offender, unless the statutory penalty for the specific charge itself meets the threshold for concurrent jurisdiction or a statutorily enumerated divestiture event occurs. The State's filing of a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties under a permissive-but-not-mandatory statute does not, by itself, divest the District Court of its exclusive original jurisdiction.
Facts:
- In August 2015, Alfred Fielding was arrested in Prince George’s County on suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol and was issued citations for various traffic offenses.
- In November 2015, Alfred Fielding was again arrested in Prince George’s County on suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol and was issued citations for various traffic offenses.
- Alfred Fielding had previously been convicted of multiple violations for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Procedural Posture:
- Alfred Fielding was charged by criminal information in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in two separate cases (CT16-0295X and CT16-0294X) for offenses allegedly committed in August and November 2015, respectively.
- Later on the same day, the State filed notices of intent to seek enhanced penalties under Maryland Rule 4-245(b) in both circuit court cases, alleging Alfred Fielding was a subsequent offender.
- Alfred Fielding moved to dismiss the charges in the circuit court, alleging the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but the circuit court denied this motion.
- Alfred Fielding noted an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which dismissed the appeal, holding that no statutory provision permitted the appeal nor was it allowed under the collateral order doctrine.
- Following remand to the circuit court, Alfred Fielding entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-242(d), to two counts of driving while under the influence of alcohol, specifically reserving his right to appeal the jurisdictional issue.
- The State entered nolle prosequi to all remaining counts in both charging documents, and Alfred Fielding was sentenced.
- Alfred Fielding thereafter noted the instant appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, again raising the claim that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the charges.
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Issue:
Does the State's filing, in the circuit court, of a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties as a subsequent offender for driving under the influence charges, which otherwise fall within the District Court's exclusive original jurisdiction, divest the District Court of that jurisdiction and vest concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court?
Opinions:
Majority - Battaglia, J.
No, the State's filing, in the circuit court, of a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties as a subsequent offender for driving under the influence charges does not divest the District Court of its exclusive original jurisdiction and vest concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court. The District Court of Maryland has exclusive original jurisdiction over vehicle law violations, as per Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"), § 4-301(a) and (b)(1), unless an exception applies. An exception for concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court exists under CJ § 4-302(d)(1)(i) if the penalty may be confinement for 3 years or more or a fine of $2,500 or more. While a third or subsequent DUI offense carries such an enhanced penalty, its imposition under Transportation Article ("TR") § 27-101(k)(1)(iii) is 'permissive-but-not-mandatory.' Eligibility for such an enhanced sentence is contingent upon the State's compliance with Maryland Rule 4-245(b), which requires notice of prior convictions to be served on the defendant before specific deadlines. As the State conceded, the notices of intent to seek enhanced penalties were filed after the criminal informations were filed in the circuit court. Therefore, at the time the informations were filed, Alfred Fielding was not yet eligible for an enhanced penalty, and the charges did not meet the concurrent jurisdiction threshold. Furthermore, the State's filing of a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties is not one of the three statutorily enumerated events in CJ § 4-302(e) and (f) that divest the District Court of its original jurisdiction. Applying the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the enumerated events are exclusive. Since the circuit court lacked fundamental subject-matter jurisdiction, its judgments were a nullity.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the critical distinction between a defendant's status as a repeat offender and their eligibility for enhanced penalties, particularly for 'permissive-but-not-mandatory' statutes. It reaffirms that proper and timely notice by the State, as a condition precedent, is crucial for seeking enhanced sentencing, and jurisdiction is strictly statutory. The ruling emphasizes prosecutorial diligence in adhering to specific jurisdictional rules and procedural prerequisites for enhanced sentencing, highlighting that courts of limited jurisdiction like the District Court cannot have their authority implicitly divested. This decision guides future cases by preventing premature filing in higher courts based solely on an intent to seek enhanced penalties without prior procedural compliance.
