Fielding v. State
719 S.W.2d 361 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt after a defendant violates a condition of deferred adjudication is a matter of absolute discretion and is not subject to appellate review. A subsequent sentence that is within the statutory range for the original offense does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, regardless of the minor nature of the violation or the judge's prior statements about sentencing.
Facts:
- B. Donald Fielding possessed a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.
- On January 9, 1985, Fielding was placed on ten years of deferred adjudication probation, a condition of which was that he commit no offense against the law.
- At the initial hearing, the trial judge warned Fielding that if he violated the conditions of his probation, he was 'talking about 60 and up' for a sentence.
- While on deferred adjudication, Fielding drove a motor vehicle on a public street while his driver's license was suspended.
- Fielding presented evidence that during his deferred adjudication period, he had undergone extensive drug rehabilitation, become employed, married, and engaged in counseling teenagers with drug problems.
- Fielding also offered evidence that he had been unaware his driver's license was suspended at the time he drove.
Procedural Posture:
- On January 9, 1985, B. Donald Fielding pled guilty in a Texas trial court to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
- The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Fielding on ten years' community supervision (probation).
- On May 24, 1985, the State filed a motion to proceed with adjudication of guilt, alleging Fielding violated a condition of his supervision.
- Following a hearing where Fielding pled 'true' to the violation, the trial court granted the State's motion, found Fielding guilty on the original drug charges, and assessed punishment at 60 years in prison for each offense.
- Fielding's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court without a hearing.
- Fielding (appellant) appealed the judgment and sentence to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing constitutional violations.
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Issue:
Does imposing a sixty-year prison sentence upon revoking deferred adjudication for a minor traffic offense violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and the guarantee of due process when the judge had previously warned the defendant he would impose such a sentence for any violation?
Opinions:
Majority - Stewart, Justice.
No, the sentence and the process by which it was imposed do not violate the Constitution. The decision to adjudicate guilt is an act of absolute discretion by the trial court and is not reviewable on appeal. The sixty-year sentences are punishment for the original, serious drug offenses, not for the minor traffic violation that triggered the revocation. Because the sixty-year sentences are within the range prescribed by statute for the drug offenses, they are not cruel and unusual punishment. The court presumes the trial judge acted correctly and considered all evidence, and the judge's motivation for the sentence is irrelevant as long as it is within the statutory limits. Furthermore, the defendant waived any potential error by failing to object or move for the judge's recusal during the hearing.
Dissenting - Guittard, Chief Justice
Yes, the sentencing process violated the due process protections of the Texas Constitution. The trial judge prejudged the sixty-year sentence at the initial hearing, thereby precluding himself from fairly considering the full range of punishment or the substantial mitigating evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation. This failure to consider relevant evidence and maintain an open mind deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial tribunal at the punishment hearing. Such a procedure is fundamentally unfair because the sentence was determined by the judge's prior threat rather than by a neutral evaluation of all relevant evidence, including the defendant's remarkable progress toward rehabilitation.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the finality and broad discretionary power of trial courts in Texas regarding deferred adjudication. It establishes that a defendant has no right to appeal the trial court's decision to revoke deferred adjudication, effectively insulating that decision from appellate scrutiny. The ruling signals that even if a judge makes a seemingly biased pre-determination of a sentence, it will likely be upheld if it falls within the statutory range and the defendant fails to make a timely objection. This precedent places a significant burden on defendants to challenge a judge's perceived bias immediately and reinforces the view of deferred adjudication as an act of legislative grace, not a right.
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