Ferrell v. Baxter

Supreme Court of Alaska
484 P.2d 250 (1971)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An unexcused violation of a traffic statute, regulation, or ordinance, which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable person, constitutes negligence per se.


Facts:

  • On February 10, 1966, Joan Ferrell was driving her car northbound on the Richardson Highway with her daughter and a friend, Mrs. Baxter.
  • Melvin S. Graves, an employee of Sea-Land, Inc., was driving a tractor-trailer southbound on the same highway.
  • The highway surface at the location of the collision, a curve, was covered with ice and some snow, and the yellow center line was partially obscured.
  • The traffic lanes had shifted due to drivers cutting the curve, making the obscured yellow line no longer the apparent center of the roadway.
  • As they entered the curve, Graves testified that Ferrell's car was straddling the center line, while Ferrell and her passenger testified that Graves' truck was in their lane.
  • Ferrell applied her brakes, causing her car to lock its wheels and slide into the left front wheels of Graves' trailer.
  • Graves testified he turned his truck off the road into a snow berm to avoid Ferrell, but the collision still occurred.
  • The collision resulted in serious personal injuries to Ferrell and Baxter, minor injuries to Linda Ferrell, and damage to both vehicles.

Procedural Posture:

  • Mrs. Baxter sued Mrs. Ferrell, Mr. Graves, and Sea-Land, Inc. for personal injuries in the superior court (trial court).
  • Mrs. Ferrell filed a cross-claim against Mr. Graves and Sea-Land for her own personal injuries.
  • Linda Ferrell sued Mr. Graves and Sea-Land for her personal injuries.
  • Sea-Land filed a cross-claim against Mrs. Ferrell for property damage to its truck.
  • Following a jury trial, the jury found Mrs. Ferrell negligent.
  • The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, awarding damages to the Baxters and Sea-Land, against Mrs. Ferrell.
  • The Ferrells (appellants) appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Alaska.

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Issue:

Does a party's unexcused violation of an applicable traffic regulation constitute negligence per se, thereby shifting the burden to that party to prove their conduct was excusable?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Connor

Yes, an unexcused violation of an applicable traffic regulation constitutes negligence per se. The court formally adopts the rules set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 286, 288A, and 288B, which provide that a court may adopt a legislative enactment or regulation as the standard of conduct for a reasonable person. An unexcused violation of such a standard is negligence in itself, not merely evidence of negligence. This approach resolves prior confusion in Alaska law, clarifying that once a plaintiff proves a defendant violated a relevant traffic law, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the violation was excused. The trial court's jury instruction, which established a prima facie case of negligence upon proof of a violation and placed the burden of proving an excuse on the violator, was consistent with this rule and therefore proper.


Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Rabinowitz

No, the court should have adopted the rule that a violation of a traffic regulation is evidence of negligence, not negligence per se. An 'evidence of negligence' rule is more easily understood by juries and better preserves the jury's traditional role in determining the standard of reasonable care. The negligence per se doctrine can have an unduly harsh impact on contributory negligence issues, especially in a legal system without comparative negligence. While concurring in the disposition of the other issues, I dissent from the court's adoption of the Restatement's negligence per se standard.



Analysis:

This decision is a landmark in Alaska tort law, formally adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts' framework for negligence per se concerning traffic law violations. By doing so, the court clarified and stabilized a previously confusing area of law, providing a clear, structured approach for trial courts. The ruling establishes that a statutory violation creates a presumption of negligence, shifting the burden of proof to the violator to present a legally sufficient excuse. This significantly impacts trial strategy in accident litigation, making it easier for plaintiffs to establish a breach of duty while providing defendants with a clear, though limited, set of recognized excuses.

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