Felty v. City of Lawton
578 P.2d 757 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
Generally, the negligence of an owner leaving keys in an unattended vehicle does not constitute the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by a third-party thief, unless 'special circumstances' exist that make both the theft and the thief's subsequent negligent operation of the vehicle highly foreseeable.
Facts:
- On May 4, 1976, Officer Leon G. Burks, a Lawton police officer, responded to an attempted arson call at 526 Southwest ‘G’ Avenue.
- Upon arriving, Officer Burks stopped his marked 1976 Plymouth police cruiser on a public highway, left the ignition keys in the car, the motor running, and the doors unlocked, leaving it unattended and out of his view.
- During this time, Ricky L. Overstreet took the police cruiser without authorization or consent.
- Approximately an hour after the theft, Ricky L. Overstreet was seen driving the stolen police cruiser at about 100 miles per hour on U.S. Highway 277.
- Ricky L. Overstreet negligently lost control of the vehicle, which struck a concrete abutment, careened across traffic lanes, crossed the median, went airborne, and collided head-on with a northbound vehicle driven by Ruby A. Dudark.
- Jennifer Ann Felty, a passenger in Ruby A. Dudark's car, was fatally injured in the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Jennifer Ann Felty's parents (Appellants/plaintiffs below) brought an action for wrongful death and damages against the City of Lawton and police officer Leon G. Burks in the District Court of Comanche County (trial court/court of first instance).
- The defendants (City of Lawton and Officer Burks) filed a general demurrer to the plaintiffs' petition.
- The District Court of Comanche County sustained the demurrer.
- The plaintiffs (Appellants) appealed the order sustaining the demurrer to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
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Issue:
Does a police officer's alleged negligence in leaving a marked police cruiser unattended with keys in the ignition and its motor running, which is subsequently stolen and driven recklessly by a third party, causing a fatal accident, constitute the proximate cause of the injury, or create 'special circumstances' that impose a special duty to prevent such harm?
Opinions:
Majority - Davison, Justice
No, Officer Burks' actions did not constitute the proximate cause of Jennifer Ann Felty's death, nor did the alleged facts establish 'special circumstances' that would impose a special duty to prevent the harm. The court reaffirmed its holding in Merchants Delivery Service, Inc. v. Joe Esco Tire Co. that for negligence to be a proximate cause, it must be the efficient cause setting the chain of events in motion, not merely a condition making the injury possible. In this case, Officer Burks' alleged negligence (leaving the keys) merely furnished a condition, while Ricky L. Overstreet's independent criminal act of stealing and recklessly driving the car was the direct and efficient cause of the injuries. The court rejected the appellants' attempts to distinguish Merchants Delivery, finding that the identity of the defendant (police officer), the vehicle (police cruiser), the type of injury (personal injury), and alleged foreseeability of theft were insufficient to establish proximate cause. Regarding the 'special circumstances' theory, the court analyzed California precedent (Richards v. Stanley, Hergenrether v. East), which recognizes that a special duty can arise when a third party's negligent acts are so foreseeable that they cannot be considered independent intervening causes. However, the court concluded that the facts pleaded by the appellants did not meet the stringent criteria for such 'special circumstances,' which typically involve factors like a high-crime neighborhood, long periods of unattendedness, and vehicles capable of inflicting severe damage. Thus, no special duty to prevent the actions of third persons arose under these facts.
Analysis:
This case reinforces a strict interpretation of proximate causation in Oklahoma, particularly when an independent criminal act (such as vehicle theft) intervenes between the defendant's alleged negligence and the resulting injury. It establishes a high bar for satisfying the 'special circumstances' exception to this rule, indicating the court's reluctance to expand liability for remote acts. Future cases seeking to hold an initial negligent party liable for a stolen vehicle's actions would need to demonstrate a compelling and exceptional degree of foreseeability, not merely of the theft itself, but specifically of the thief's subsequent negligent and injurious operation of the vehicle, by meeting the stringent factors of the 'special circumstances' test.
