Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co.
514 N.E.2d 1095, 401 Mass. 141, 1987 Mass. LEXIS 1508 (1987)
Rule of Law:
A person may not recover for loss of consortium unless they are legally married to the injured party, as the right is specifically tied to the institution of marriage and its correlative responsibilities.
Facts:
- Marcial Feliciano sustained personal injuries due to Miguel Costa's wrongful conduct in the course of his employment by Rosemar Silver Company.
- Dolores Feliciano and Marcial Feliciano had lived together as husband and wife for approximately twenty years before Marcial's injuries in 1981.
- During those years, Dolores used Marcial’s surname, and they held themselves out as husband and wife.
- Dolores and Marcial had joint savings accounts, filed joint tax returns, and jointly owned their home.
- They depended on each other for companionship, comfort, love, and guidance, and maintained an exclusive sexual relationship.
- Dolores and Marcial were not legally married until 1983.
Procedural Posture:
- Marcial Feliciano and Dolores Feliciano commenced an action in the Superior Court (trial court) against Miguel Costa and Rosemar Silver Company, claiming Marcial sustained personal injuries and Dolores sustained loss of consortium.
- Rosemar Silver Company moved for summary judgment on Dolores Feliciano's loss of consortium claim.
- The Superior Court allowed Rosemar Silver Company's motion for summary judgment.
- Dolores Feliciano appealed the Superior Court's judgment.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took the case on its own initiative (bypassing the intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who lived with an injured party for approximately twenty years as a de facto married couple, but was not legally married at the time of injury, have a right to recover for loss of consortium?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Connor, J.
No, a person who lived with an injured party as a de facto married couple but was not legally married at the time of injury does not have a right to recover for loss of consortium. The court emphasized that the right of recovery for loss of a spouse's consortium, established in cases like Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., promotes the high social importance of marriage as the foundation of the family, as articulated in French v. McAnarney. To extend this right to unmarried cohabitants would subvert the value of marriage by granting recovery without the acceptance of marriage's correlative responsibilities. Furthermore, as a matter of policy, tort liability cannot be extended without limit. Distinguishing between the marriage relationship and the 'myriad relationships' between cohabitants serves to limit protection to interests and values that are reasonably ascertainable. The court explicitly rejected the standard of a 'stable and significant' relationship, relied upon in Butcher v. Superior Court, as unsatisfactorily vague and indefinite. The court also noted a lack of recognition for such a right by any state court of last resort, and that prior federal decisions allowing such recovery were subsequently repudiated by the relevant states.
Analysis:
This case firmly establishes a bright-line rule that limits loss of consortium claims strictly to legally married individuals, thereby reinforcing the traditional legal and social significance of marriage. The court's policy concerns about the limitless expansion of tort liability and the difficulty of defining 'stable and significant' relationships will likely be cited in future cases to resist attempts by unmarried partners to seek similar damages. This decision underscores a judicial preference for clear, easily ascertainable legal categories over fact-specific inquiries into the nature of intimate relationships, which can have significant implications for evolving family structures and the scope of tort recovery.
