Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki

Supreme Court of the United States
170 L. Ed. 2d 10, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2196, 552 U.S. 389 (2008)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) constitutes a 'charge' under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) if, in addition to the regulatory requirements of naming the respondent and alleging discrimination, it can be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or settle the dispute.

Facts:

In 1994 and 1995, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) initiated two programs, 'Best Practice Pays' (BPP) and 'Minimum Acceptable Performance Standards' (MAPS), which tied its couriers' compensation and continued employment to performance benchmarks.
A group of current and former FedEx couriers over the age of 40, including Patricia Kennedy, were subject to these programs.
The couriers believed the programs were a pretext to harass and discriminate against older workers in favor of younger ones and force them out of the company before they could receive retirement benefits.
On December 11, 2001, Kennedy submitted an EEOC Form 283, labeled an 'Intake Questionnaire,' to the EEOC.
Kennedy attached a signed, six-page affidavit to the questionnaire, detailing the alleged discriminatory practices by FedEx.
The affidavit concluded with the statement: 'Please force Federal Express to end their age discrimination plan so we can finish out our careers absent the unfairness and hostile work environment...'
On the questionnaire, Kennedy also checked a box consenting to the disclosure of her identity to her employer, FedEx.

Procedural Posture:

Patricia Kennedy and other couriers filed a lawsuit against Federal Express Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
FedEx filed a motion to dismiss Kennedy's claim, arguing she failed to file a valid charge with the EEOC at least 60 days before filing suit.
The District Court (trial court) granted FedEx's motion to dismiss, finding that Kennedy's submitted documents did not constitute a charge.
Kennedy, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Kennedy's filing was sufficient to be considered a charge.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the definition of a 'charge' under the ADEA.

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Issue:

Does a filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), consisting of an 'Intake Questionnaire' and a detailed affidavit that requests agency action, constitute a 'charge' under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), thereby satisfying the prerequisite for filing a civil action?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Kennedy

Yes. A filing that can be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action constitutes a 'charge' under the ADEA. The Court defers to the EEOC's interpretation, which holds that a filing is a charge if it asks the agency to activate its enforcement and remedial processes. This standard is consistent with the ADEA's remedial scheme, which is designed to be accessible to laypersons who may not be familiar with legal formalities. Kennedy's filing met this test because her detailed affidavit explicitly requested that the agency 'force' FedEx to end its discriminatory practices, and she consented to having her identity disclosed to the employer. The statutory right of an individual to sue is conditioned on their filing of a charge, not on the EEOC's subsequent fulfillment of its own statutory duties, such as notifying the employer.

Dissenting - Justice Thomas

No. The filing did not constitute a 'charge' because it did not objectively manifest an intent to initiate the EEOC's formal enforcement proceedings. The ordinary meaning of a 'charge' is a formal accusation that initiates legal action. The majority's 'request for action' test is too malleable and broad, failing to distinguish between a request for pre-charge counseling and a formal charge. Kennedy's filing included numerous indicators that it was not a formal charge: the form itself was titled 'Intake Questionnaire' for 'pre-charge' purposes, and Kennedy requested that her affidavit be kept confidential. The EEOC's own failure to treat the filing as a charge—by not assigning a charge number or notifying FedEx—confirms it was not one. The majority's vague standard creates uncertainty and undermines the statutory requirement of notice to the employer.

Analysis:

This decision establishes a flexible, objective standard for what constitutes a 'charge' under the ADEA, prioritizing accessibility for pro se claimants over strict procedural formalities. By defining a charge as a filing that reasonably requests agency action, the Court broadens the scope of documents that can preserve an employee's right to sue. This ruling places less emphasis on the specific form used and more on the filer's expressed intent for the agency to intervene. Consequently, it decouples the validity of a charge from the EEOC's subsequent administrative actions, meaning the agency's failure to notify an employer or begin conciliation does not invalidate the employee's charge, potentially impacting the statutory goal of early, informal dispute resolution.

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