Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
105 S. Ct. 1459, 470 U.S. 480, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 66 (1985)
Rule of Law:
A federal statute limiting independent political expenditures by political committees in support of publicly financed presidential candidates violates the First Amendment because such expenditures do not pose a sufficient risk of corruption or the appearance of corruption to justify the restriction on political speech.
Facts:
- The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act) offers Presidential candidates of major parties the option of receiving public financing for their general election campaigns.
- If a Presidential candidate accepts public financing, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) makes it a criminal offense for independent "political committees" to expend more than $1,000 to further that candidate’s election.
- National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund For A Conservative Majority (FCM) are nonprofit, nonmembership political committees with conservative political philosophies.
- NCPAC and FCM solicited funds and spent money on means such as radio and television advertisements to encourage voters to elect President Ronald Reagan in 1980.
- These expenditures were "independent," meaning they were not made at the request of or in coordination with the official Reagan election campaign committee or any of its agents.
- NCPAC and FCM expressed their intention to conduct similar independent activities in support of President Reagan’s reelection in 1984.
- In 1979-1980, approximately 101,000 people contributed an average of $75 each to NCPAC, and in 1980, approximately 100,000 people contributed an average of $25 each to FCM.
Procedural Posture:
- In May 1983, the Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and Edward Mezvinsky filed suit against National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund For A Conservative Majority (FCM) in a three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaratory judgment that 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) was constitutional.
- The Federal Election Commission (FEC) intervened in the Democrats' lawsuit, moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.
- In June 1983, the FEC brought a separate action against NCPAC and FCM, seeking identical declaratory relief.
- The two cases were consolidated by the three-judge District Court for all purposes.
- The District Court held that the Democrats had standing under § 9011(b)(1) and Article III to seek the requested declaratory relief.
- The District Court also held that the Democrats and the FEC were not entitled to a declaration that § 9012(f) is constitutional, concluding that the statute abridges First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, is substantially overbroad, and cannot be given a permissible narrowing construction.
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Issue:
Does 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f), which prohibits independent political committees from spending more than $1,000 to further the election of a publicly financed Presidential candidate, violate the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) violates the First Amendment because independent expenditures by political committees, even if substantial, do not tend to corrupt or create the appearance of corruption in a manner sufficient to justify the restriction on political speech. The Court first addressed the issue of standing, finding that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) had standing under § 9011(b)(1) to bring a declaratory action to test the constitutionality of a Fund Act provision. However, the Court reversed the District Court's holding that the Democratic Party and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) also had standing. It reasoned that while § 9011(b)(1) identifies "the national committee of any political party" and "individuals eligible to vote for President" as authorized to bring actions "appropriate to implement or construe" the Fund Act, this must be read in conjunction with 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1), which grants the FEC "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement" of the Act. Therefore, "appropriate" actions by private parties are limited to suits against the FEC, challenging its interpretations or implementation of the Act, to avoid interfering with the FEC’s exclusive enforcement responsibilities. On the First Amendment issue, the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment. It reiterated the principle from Buckley v. Valeo that restrictions on the amount of money spent on political communication necessarily reduce the quantity of expression, as virtually all communication in mass society requires money. These expenditures represent "speech at the core of the First Amendment" and implicate the freedom of association, as political action committees (PACs) serve as mechanisms for individuals of modest means to amplify their voices. The Court rejected the "speech by proxy" argument, noting that contributors generally endorse the PACs' message. The Court reaffirmed that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is the only legitimate and compelling governmental interest for restricting campaign finances. Citing Buckley, the Court found no tendency in independent expenditures, uncoordinated with the candidate, to corrupt or create the appearance of corruption. Even if large PACs could hypothetically pose a risk of corruption, § 9012(f) is "fatally overbroad" because it applies indiscriminately to any "committee, association, or organization" spending more than $1,000, not just large, wealthy PACs. The Court found the FEC's evidence of actual or apparent corruption to be "evanescent" and insufficient. The Court distinguished FEC v. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC), noting that case turned on the special historical treatment of corporations, whereas § 9012(f) applies to various organizational forms.
Dissenting - Justice White
No, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) does not violate the First Amendment because regulating campaign spending, particularly independent expenditures by PACs, is supported by compelling governmental interests, including avoiding corruption, maintaining public confidence in the electoral process, and equalizing candidate resources. Furthermore, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) should have standing to bring this action. Justice White disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "appropriate" in § 9011(b)(1), arguing it refers to the type of suit (implementing or construing the Act) rather than an undefined standard of sound policy or a restriction on who can sue whom. He asserted that the statute's plain terms confer standing on the DNC and that the majority's reading creates an implied repeal of § 9011(b)(1) by virtue of § 437c(b)(1) (FEC's exclusive enforcement jurisdiction), which should not be inferred without clear congressional intent. He noted that legislative history suggests Congress intended "other interested parties" to bring actions for "expeditious disposition." On the First Amendment issue, Justice White reiterated his belief that Buckley v. Valeo was wrongly decided, contending that the First Amendment protects the right to speak, not to spend, and that limitations on spending are not the same as restrictions on speaking. He argued that the burden on actual speech is minimal and indirect, while the governmental interests (avoiding corruption, maintaining public confidence, equalizing resources, and limiting overall spending) are legitimate and substantial. He challenged Buckley's distinction between "independent" and "coordinated" expenditures, stating it "blinks political reality" as independent PAC expenditures effectively function as contributions and are often a direct response to contribution limits. He argued that candidates cannot help but notice and appreciate extensive independent efforts, raising the danger of quid pro quo. He emphasized that § 9012(f) is part of the Fund Act's public financing scheme, which was intended to be comprehensive and exclusive, totally substituting for private financing. This public financing context provides additional compelling governmental interests, such as preventing corruption (since all other private contributions are zero), controlling spiraling campaign costs, and ensuring candidates compete on a more equal financial footing. He concluded that striking down § 9012(f) undermines the coherent regulatory scheme.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
No, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) does not violate the First Amendment, as limitations on independent expenditures are justified by congressional interests in promoting equal access to the political arena and eliminating political corruption. Furthermore, the DNC should have standing to bring this action. Justice Marshall stated he had changed his view on the contribution/expenditure distinction established in Buckley v. Valeo, now believing it has no constitutional significance. He reasoned that when direct financial assistance to candidates is severely limited, individuals will find other ways to financially benefit campaigns through independent expenditures. It "simply belies reality" to suggest that a campaign will not reward massive financial assistance provided in the only legally available way, creating a powerful incentive for a quid pro quo. He also disagreed that the constitutional interests implicated by limitations on contributions and expenditures are significantly different; both involve core First Amendment rights (speech and association) and concern the amount of money spent on political activity. He joined Parts II-A, II-C, and II-D of Justice White’s dissent, which address the First Amendment arguments for upholding the statute, and Part I, concerning the standing of the Democratic National Committee.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Stevens
Yes, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) violates the First Amendment. However, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) should have standing to bring this action. Justice Stevens tentatively disagreed with the majority on the standing issue, believing that the plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the DNC and that the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) standing is not a sufficient reason to deny it to the DNC. However, he deemed it unnecessary to definitively decide the standing issue, as the disposition of the appeal on the constitutional question controlled the outcome of the case. Accordingly, he joined only Part II of the majority opinion, which addresses the constitutionality of § 9012(f).
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforced Buckley v. Valeo's core distinction between direct contributions to candidates and independent expenditures under the First Amendment, making it exceedingly difficult for Congress to regulate independent spending in federal elections. By reiterating that only the prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof is a compelling interest for campaign finance regulation, and defining corruption narrowly as a quid pro quo, the Court restricted the government's ability to address other perceived harms of large-scale spending, such as unequal access or the influence of wealth. The ruling underscored the Court's skepticism toward congressional findings regarding the potential for subtle influence, thereby limiting legislative power to craft comprehensive campaign finance reform beyond direct contributions, even within a publicly funded election system. This decision continues to shape the landscape of campaign finance law, highlighting the robust protection afforded to political spending as a form of speech.
