Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
107 S. Ct. 616, 479 U.S. 238, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 26 (1986)
Rule of Law:
Section 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act violates the First Amendment when applied to prohibit independent expenditures by non-profit, non-stock corporations that are formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, have no shareholders, and do not accept contributions from business corporations or labor unions.
Facts:
- Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) was incorporated as a non-profit, non-stock corporation with the purpose of fostering respect for human life and defending the right to life.
- MCFL did not accept contributions from business corporations or unions, relying instead on voluntary donations from members and fundraising activities.
- In September 1978, prior to the primary elections, MCFL prepared a "Special Edition" newsletter headlined "EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE."
- The Special Edition listed candidates for state and federal office, identifying them as supporting or opposing MCFL's positions, and featured photographs of 13 candidates with 100% favorable voting records.
- The publication explicitly exhorted readers to "VOTE PRO-LIFE" and stated that no pro-life candidate could win without their vote.
- MCFL printed over 100,000 copies of this edition, distributing them to the general public, which was significantly larger than its regular newsletter circulation of roughly 3,000.
- MCFL spent $9,812.76 from its general treasury funds to publish and circulate the edition.
- MCFL did not establish a separate segregated fund (PAC) to finance these expenditures.
Procedural Posture:
- The Federal Election Commission (FEC) found probable cause that MCFL violated the Act and filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking a civil penalty.
- The District Court granted MCFL's motion for summary judgment, holding the statute did not apply or was unconstitutional.
- The FEC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals held the statute applied to MCFL but affirmed the District Court's holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.
- The FEC petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does 2 U.S.C. § 441b constitutionally prohibit a non-profit, non-stock ideological corporation from using its general treasury funds to publish independent campaign literature expressly advocating for specific candidates?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes, the statute technically applies, but No, it is unconstitutional as applied to this specific organization. The Court first determined that MCFL's "Special Edition" constituted "express advocacy" under the Act because it explicitly urged the election of specific candidates, and it did not qualify for the press exemption because it was not a regular periodical. However, the Court held that the restriction was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL. While the government has a compelling interest in preventing the corruption associated with the aggregation of wealth by business corporations, this rationale does not apply to voluntary political associations like MCFL. MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass economic capital, and it has no shareholders to protect. Therefore, the heavy administrative burden of forming a separate segregated fund (PAC) infringed upon MCFL's core First Amendment speech without a compelling state justification.
Concurrence - Justice O'Connor
Yes, the statute applies, but No, it cannot constitutionally restrict MCFL. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the burden imposed by the Act was not merely the requirement of disclosure, but the significant organizational restraints involved in operating as a political committee. She agreed that groups like MCFL do not pose the danger of corruption that justifies such infringement on core political expression.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes, the statute applies, and Yes, it is constitutional. The dissent argued that the Court should defer to the legislative judgment of Congress, which decided that corporations as a class pose a risk to the political process. The dissent contended that since MCFL enjoys the advantages of the corporate form (such as limited liability), it should be subject to the accompanying regulations. The dissent believed the distinction between business corporations and ideological non-profits should be drawn by Congress, not the judiciary.
Dissent - Justice White
Yes, the statute is constitutional. Justice White adhered to his previous views that the government has a legitimate interest in regulating the use of money in federal elections to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, and this regulation should extend to organizations like MCFL.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision in campaign finance law because it carved out a constitutional exemption (the "MCFL exemption") to the ban on corporate independent expenditures. It distinguished between traditional business corporations, which amass wealth through economic transactions, and ideological non-profits, which amass funds through political support. The decision affirms that independent expenditures are core political speech and establishes that the corporate form alone is not enough to justify suppressing that speech if the underlying rationale of "anti-distortion" or shareholder protection is absent. This case set the stage for later distinctions between express advocacy and issue advocacy.
