Federal Election Commission v. Akins
524 U.S. 11 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff suffers a concrete 'injury in fact' sufficient for Article III standing when they are deprived of information that a statute requires to be disclosed, even if this injury is widely shared among the public.
Facts:
- The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is an organization that lobbies elected officials and disseminates information about political candidates.
- A group of voters (respondents), whose views often oppose AIPAC's, believed AIPAC's activities qualified it as a 'political committee' under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
- The voters alleged that AIPAC made over $1,000 in 'expenditures' to influence federal elections, including funding meetings with candidates and distributing candidate position papers.
- Under FECA, an organization deemed a 'political committee' must register with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and publicly disclose its membership, contributions, and expenditures.
- AIPAC contended that its spending did not qualify as 'expenditures' under FECA because the activities were communications with its own members, which are statutorily exempt.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of voters, including James E. Akins, filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) against the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
- The FEC dismissed the complaint, ruling that AIPAC was not a 'political committee' because its 'major purpose' was not the election of candidates.
- The voters filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking review of the FEC's dismissal.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the FEC.
- A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel's decision, holding that the FEC's 'major purpose' test was an improper interpretation of the statute.
- The FEC successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a group of voters have Article III standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's decision not to bring an enforcement action against an organization, where the voters' alleged injury is the denial of information that would have been disclosed had the enforcement action been successful?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
Yes, a group of voters has standing in this context. The Court held that the inability to obtain information that Congress has decided to make public by statute is a concrete 'injury in fact' that satisfies Article III's standing requirements. The Court reasoned that Congress, through FECA, specifically intended to protect voters by providing them with campaign finance information. This 'informational injury' is distinct and palpable, not abstract, and is sufficient for standing even if it is a widely shared grievance common to many citizens. Distinguishing this case from United States v. Richardson, the Court noted that the voters here asserted a specific statutory right to information designed to aid their voting decisions, not a generalized grievance based on a broad constitutional clause. The injury is also 'fairly traceable' to the FEC's decision and 'redressable' by a court order remanding the case to the agency.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, the voters do not have standing. The dissent argued that the respondents' claim is a nonjusticiable 'generalized grievance' because the alleged harm—the unavailability of information—is undifferentiated and common to all members of the public. This case is indistinguishable from United States v. Richardson, which held that a citizen's interest in information to help them vote is constitutionally inadequate to confer standing. The majority's attempt to distinguish Richardson is unpersuasive. To have standing, an injury must be 'particularized,' meaning it affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Allowing any voter to sue to compel executive enforcement based on such a common grievance unconstitutionally transfers the President’s duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' to the judicial branch.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the 'injury in fact' requirement for Article III standing, particularly regarding 'informational injury' and the 'generalized grievance' doctrine. By holding that a widely shared harm can be sufficiently concrete for standing when tied to a statutory right to information, the Court expanded the ability of citizens to challenge agency inaction. The case empowers citizen-suit provisions in statutes with disclosure requirements, such as campaign finance laws, and reinforces the principle that Congress can create legally protected interests whose violation constitutes a cognizable injury. It solidifies the idea that the denial of information itself, when mandated by law for public benefit, is a distinct and particular harm, not merely an abstract complaint about government conduct.
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