Federal Election Comm'n v. Ted Cruz
596 U.S. 289 (2022)
Rule of Law:
A limit on the amount of post-election contributions that a political campaign may use to repay a candidate's personal loans unconstitutionally burdens political speech and is not justified by the government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.
Facts:
- During his 2018 reelection campaign for the U.S. Senate, Senator Ted Cruz loaned his campaign committee $260,000 from his personal assets one day before the election.
- Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) limits the amount of post-election contributions a campaign can use to repay personal loans from a candidate to $250,000.
- Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations further stipulate that any amount over the $250,000 cap that remains unpaid 20 days after the election must be treated as a contribution from the candidate to the campaign, effectively precluding repayment.
- After the election, the Committee had a net debt of approximately $340,000.
- The Committee repaid Cruz $250,000 within the statutory window but left $10,000 unpaid after the 20-day deadline passed to trigger the statute's limitation.
- Because the 20-day window expired, the regulations converted the remaining $10,000 into a contribution, preventing the campaign from repaying Cruz the final portion of his loan.
Procedural Posture:
- Cruz and the Committee filed a lawsuit against the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
- A three-judge district court panel was convened pursuant to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's specific jurisdictional requirements.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Cruz and the Committee on their constitutional claim.
- The FEC filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which prohibits campaigns from using more than $250,000 of post-election contributions to repay a candidate's personal loans, violate the First Amendment right to political speech?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes. The Court held that the loan-repayment limitation violates the First Amendment because it burdens the core right of candidates to use personal funds for political speech without serving a sufficient anti-corruption interest. The Court first established that the limitation burdens speech by increasing the financial risk to candidates who loan money to their campaigns, thereby deterring them from self-funding—a critical source of speech, especially for challengers. Regarding the government's justification, the Court rejected the argument that the limit prevents corruption. The Court emphasized that the only permissible ground for restricting political speech is preventing 'quid pro quo' corruption (a direct exchange of an official act for money), not merely preventing 'influence' or 'access.' The Court found the government failed to provide evidence that repaying candidate loans with post-election funds leads to actual quid pro quo arrangements, noting that individual contributions are already capped at $2,900 to prevent such corruption. The Court characterized the law as an unnecessary 'prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis.'
Dissenting - Justice Kagan
No. The dissent argued that Section 304 is a constitutional anti-corruption measure that addresses the unique danger of donations that go directly into an officeholder's pocket. Justice Kagan contended that the burden on speech is minimal because the law restricts only a specific method of third-party financing (post-election repayment), not the candidate's ability to spend their own money. The dissent emphasized that post-election contributions used to repay personal loans pose a heightened risk of corruption because the candidate knows exactly who is paying them back after they have already won the election, creating a clear opportunity for 'quid pro quo' arrangements. The dissent criticized the majority for ignoring the 'common sense' reality that putting money directly into a politician's personal bank account creates an appearance of corruption that Congress is entitled to regulate.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the Supreme Court's skeptical approach to campaign finance regulations, specifically those that burden a candidate's ability to self-fund or manage campaign debt. By striking down Section 304, the Court signaled that it requires concrete proof of 'quid pro quo' corruption—defined strictly as a direct exchange of money for official acts—rather than general concerns about influence, access, or the appearance of impropriety. The ruling likely makes it easier for wealthy candidates to self-finance their campaigns with the expectation of being repaid by donors later, potentially increasing the role of money in elections. It also confirms that the Court views restrictions on the mechanisms of campaign funding (like loan repayment) as burdens on speech itself if they deter the initial expenditure.
