Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California
1984 U.S. LEXIS 139, 468 U.S. 364, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A federal statute that prohibits noncommercial educational broadcast stations receiving public funds from all editorializing violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.
Facts:
- In 1967, Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act to support and promote noncommercial, educational broadcasting.
- The Act established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nonprofit corporation, to disburse federal funds to noncommercial stations.
- Section 399 of the Act, as amended, forbade any noncommercial station that receives a grant from the CPB from engaging in editorializing.
- Pacifica Foundation is a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates several noncommercial educational broadcasting stations.
- Pacifica's stations received grants from the CPB and were therefore prohibited by Section 399 from broadcasting their management's own opinions on public issues.
Procedural Posture:
- Pacifica Foundation and other appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the constitutionality of Section 399.
- The Department of Justice, after initially declining to defend the statute under one administration, announced it would defend the statute under a new administration.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Pacifica, holding that Section 399's ban on editorializing violated the First Amendment.
- The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the appellant, appealed the District Court's judgment directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which forbids any noncommercial educational broadcasting station receiving a grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from engaging in editorializing, violate the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act violates the First Amendment. While broadcast speech is subject to regulation, any restriction must be narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest. This statute is not. The law suppresses speech at the core of First Amendment protection—the expression of editorial opinion—and is a content-based regulation. The government’s asserted interests, protecting stations from becoming vehicles for government propaganda and preventing capture by private partisan interests, are not substantially advanced by this broad ban. The Public Broadcasting Act already contains numerous structural safeguards to ensure station independence, making the risk of government influence speculative. Furthermore, the ban is both overinclusive, suppressing editorials on purely local matters, and underinclusive, as stations can still air controversial views through program selection and guest interviews. Lastly, this is not a valid exercise of the spending power under Regan v. Taxation With Representation because, unlike the entity in that case, a station receiving any federal funds is barred from using its private funds for editorializing and cannot segregate its activities.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. This dissent joins Justice Rehnquist's opinion, finding the prohibition on editorializing to be a constitutional condition on the receipt of government funds that stands or falls with the permissible ban on candidate endorsements.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No. The ban on editorializing does not violate the First Amendment because Congress has simply exercised its spending power to refuse to subsidize the private views of station management with taxpayer money. When a station accepts public funds, it accepts the conditions attached. This case is analogous to Regan v. Taxation With Representation, where the Court upheld a refusal to subsidize lobbying. The ban is a rational and neutral means for Congress to avoid the use of public money for partisan politics and to prevent the appearance of government sponsorship of particular views.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. The ban on editorializing is a constitutional safeguard that serves the overriding interest of keeping the Federal Government out of the propaganda business. This interest is particularly important in the powerful and government-licensed medium of electronic communication. The statute is a viewpoint-neutral restriction designed to protect the marketplace of ideas from the insidious evils of government-funded propaganda. The potential for political pressure tied to funding is real, and this prophylactic measure is a legitimate legislative judgment entitled to respect.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits Congress's ability to use its spending power to impose broad, content-based restrictions on the speech of funding recipients. It establishes that even in the regulated broadcast industry, a complete ban on a core form of political speech like editorializing requires a strong justification and must be narrowly tailored. The ruling distinguishes between a government choosing not to subsidize a specific activity (permissible) and prohibiting all such activity for an entity that accepts any level of funding (impermissible), thereby protecting the ability of subsidized entities to use private funds for protected speech.
