Feazel v. Feazel
222 La. 113, 1952 La. LEXIS 1313, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952)
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Rule of Law:
The presumption of paternity, holding the husband of the mother as the father of children conceived during marriage, is one of the strongest in law and can only be rebutted by strict proof of the physical impossibility of cohabitation or by proving the wife's adultery coinciding with conception coupled with actual concealment of the child's birth from the husband; a spouse's testimony alone is insufficient to establish adultery or disavow paternity.
Facts:
- Maurice Felton Feazel and Bertha Aline Feazel married in Shreveport on August 17, 1947.
- They resided together at their matrimonial domicile in Shreveport for seven days before separating, with Bertha returning to her mother's home and Maurice returning to his family's home in the same city.
- Maurice testified he never had sexual relations with Bertha during their marriage because she was menstruating during their cohabitation period, and they lived separate and apart thereafter.
- Maurice alleged that on December 5, 1947, Bertha committed adultery in a hotel room in Shreveport with an unknown man.
- In March 1948, Bertha left Shreveport and moved to Salina, Kansas, where she gave birth to a child, Pamela Marie Feazel, on August 5, 1948.
- Maurice was informed of the child's birth around mid-August 1948.
- A birth certificate for Pamela Marie Feazel, issued by the State of Kansas and based on information given by Bertha, stated the child was legitimate, named Maurice F. Feazel as the father (including his age, address, and occupation), and listed Bertha's mailing address as Shreveport, Louisiana.
Procedural Posture:
- Maurice Felton Feazel (plaintiff) initiated an action in the district court (court of first instance) against his wife, Bertha Aline Feazel (defendant), seeking a divorce on the ground of adultery and disavowal of paternity for a child born during their marriage.
- A curator ad hoc was appointed to represent Bertha Aline Feazel, who was an absentee, and a tutor ad hoc was appointed to represent the minor child, Pamela Marie Feazel.
- Plaintiff sought to confirm a default judgment previously entered, presenting evidence in support of his claims.
- The taking of testimony in the district court began on November 10, 1948, and after failing to adduce sufficient evidence of adultery, the case was continued for further testimony to March 2, 1949.
- The district court rejected the plaintiff's demands for divorce and disavowal of paternity.
- Maurice Felton Feazel (appellant) appealed from the judgment of the district court to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
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Issue:
Does a husband have sufficient grounds under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 185 and 189 to disavow the paternity of a child born during his marriage, either by proving physical impossibility of cohabitation or by proving adultery combined with concealment of birth, and is the mother's testimony denying the husband's paternity admissible to establish adultery or disavowal?
Opinions:
Majority - HAWTHORNE, Justice
No, Maurice Feazel does not have sufficient grounds to disavow the paternity of the child, nor can his wife's testimony be used to bastardize the child. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that the husband failed to overcome the exceptionally strong legal presumption of paternity. Under Article 189 of the LSA-Civil Code, the husband failed to prove physical impossibility of cohabitation, as both spouses resided in Shreveport for several months after their separation, meaning their residences were not so remote as to make access physically impossible. The legal standard requires literal proof of physical impossibility, not merely moral. Under Article 185, the husband failed to establish that the birth of the child was concealed from him. While the wife gave birth in Kansas, there was no evidence she left Shreveport for the purpose of concealment. Furthermore, the birth certificate itself, introduced by the plaintiff, explicitly named Maurice as the father and provided identifying details and addresses, directly refuting any claim of concealment. The court also found the proof of adultery insufficient. The trial judge, who observed the only witness testifying to adultery, did not find her testimony credible, noting the suspicious timing (exactly eight months before birth) and circumstances (unlocked door for such an act), and this court found no error in that assessment. Finally, the wife's testimony in interrogatories denying sexual relations with Maurice and asserting he was not the father was disregarded. Citing precedents like Tate v. Penne and Succession of Saloy, the court reiterated that a child's condition (legitimacy) cannot be affected by the declarations of spouses, and a simple confession of adultery by one party is insufficient for a divorce, requiring "stick facts" as substantive evidence.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the 'pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant' presumption of paternity in Louisiana law, establishing an extraordinarily high bar for disavowal. It clarifies that merely separating or having an absent spouse is insufficient; physical impossibility of cohabitation must be proven literally. Moreover, it emphasizes that concealment of birth requires affirmative actions by the mother to hide the child from the husband, not just giving birth elsewhere. The ruling also underscores the protective nature of the law towards the legitimacy of children, making a spouse's testimony, particularly if it aims to bastardize a child or relies on simple confessions of adultery, inadmissible or insufficient to overcome the legal presumption or establish grounds for divorce.
