Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris
377 P.2d 42 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
A defamatory publication aimed at a moderately sized, identifiable group, such as a university sports team, can be considered libel per se as to an individual member of that group, even if the individual is not specifically named.
Facts:
- In 1958, Fawcett Publications, Inc. published an article in 'True' Magazine titled 'The Pill That Can Kill Sports', which discussed the use of amphetamines by athletes.
- The article specifically mentioned the 1956 University of Oklahoma (O.U.) football team, which consisted of sixty to seventy members.
- The article stated that O.U. players were observed being sprayed in the nostrils with an atomizer during their winning season and strongly implied this substance was an illegal performance-enhancing drug like amphetamine.
- Dennit Morris was a fullback on the 1956 O.U. football team and played in most of the team's games.
- In reality, the substance administered to the O.U. players via atomizer was 'spirits of peppermint', a harmless substance used to relieve mouth dryness.
- Fawcett Publications exercised significant control over its Oklahoma distributor, Mid-Continent News Company, through a detailed contract and a 'traveling representative' who monitored operations.
Procedural Posture:
- Dennit Morris sued Fawcett Publications, Inc. and its distributor, Mid-Continent News Company, for libel in an Oklahoma trial court.
- At the conclusion of the trial, the court sustained Mid-Continent’s motion for a directed verdict, releasing it from the case.
- The trial court instructed the jury to return a verdict against Fawcett, leaving only the amount of damages to be determined.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Morris and against Fawcett for $75,000 in actual damages.
- Fawcett Publications, Inc. appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
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Issue:
Does a defamatory article that refers to a group, such as a university football team, without naming a specific individual, constitute libel per se as to an identifiable member of that group?
Opinions:
Majority - Jackson, Justice
Yes, a defamatory article referring to a group can constitute libel per se as to an identifiable member. The court first established jurisdiction over Fawcett, finding its extensive control over its in-state distributor constituted 'doing business' in Oklahoma. On the merits, the court held the article was defamatory on its face because it exposed the team to public hatred and contempt by unequivocally suggesting they illegally used drugs. The court rejected the argument that a plaintiff must be explicitly named, stating that the key question is whether the publication refers to the plaintiff. Critically, the court addressed the 'group libel' doctrine, declining to adopt a rigid rule based solely on the size of the group. Instead, the court adopted a 'more realistic approach' where the test is the 'intensity of the suspicion cast upon the plaintiff.' Because the article targeted the entire 60-70 member team, and Morris was a well-known, regular player, the defamation applied to him individually.
Dissenting - Halley, Justice
No, the article is not libel per se as to Dennit Morris. The dissenting opinion argues that the article never explicitly stated that using the spray was a crime, nor did it say Morris himself partook of any drug. For a publication to be libelous per se, it must be injurious on its face without the need for extrinsic proof. This article, at most, constitutes libel per quod, which would require the plaintiff to plead and prove special damages (actual financial loss), which Morris failed to do. The dissent concluded that it was 'unthinkable' the article would expose Morris to public hatred or contempt, particularly given his subsequent successful career, and therefore the trial court committed reversible error by not requiring proof of special damages.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its flexible approach to the group libel doctrine, moving away from a strict, numbers-based test. By focusing on the 'intensity of suspicion' cast upon an individual member, the ruling provides a path for recovery for members of small-to-moderately sized, well-defined groups (like sports teams, corporate boards, or small faculties). The decision clarifies that a publisher cannot escape liability for defaming every member of a group simply by avoiding individual names. This precedent lowers the bar for plaintiffs in group libel situations, provided the group is cohesive and identifiable enough that the defamation attaches to each individual's reputation.
