Favrot v. Barnes
332 So. 2d 873 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
An ex-spouse seeking post-divorce alimony bears the burden of proving that circumstances prevent them from supporting themselves through reasonable employment. Furthermore, private pre-marital agreements cannot alter the fundamental, non-property-related obligations of marriage, and a breach of such an agreement does not constitute legal fault sufficient to bar alimony.
Facts:
- Prior to their marriage, Clifford F. Favrot, Jr. and Katherine Boulet Barnes executed a pre-marital agreement stipulating that they would maintain separate property.
- The agreement contained a waiver by each party of any "claim to the property" of the other in the event of divorce or death.
- In separate pre-marital discussions, Favrot and Barnes verbally agreed to limit sexual intercourse to approximately once per week.
- Barnes had been employed as a school teacher before the marriage.
- During the marriage, a personality conflict arose between Favrot and Barnes's teenage daughter from a previous marriage.
- To placate Favrot, Barnes sent her daughter to live outside the home for the last year and a half of the marriage.
Procedural Posture:
- Following their divorce, a trial court awarded post-divorce alimony to Katherine Boulet Barnes.
- Clifford F. Favrot, Jr., as appellant, appealed the trial court's alimony award to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, arguing Barnes was not entitled to it.
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Issue:
Does an ex-spouse's alleged breach of a pre-marital agreement limiting sexual frequency constitute legal fault barring alimony, and must an alimony-seeking spouse prove they are unable to find employment to be entitled to support?
Opinions:
Majority - Redmann, J.
No, the breach of an unenforceable pre-marital agreement on personal marital duties does not constitute legal fault, but an ex-spouse seeking alimony must now prove they are unable to be self-supporting. The court reasoned that a pre-marital agreement cannot validly alter the core obligations of marriage, such as the mutual duty to fulfill reasonable sexual desires. Therefore, Barnes's alleged failure to adhere to the pre-marital agreement on sexual frequency is not a legal fault that would disqualify her from receiving alimony. However, citing evolving constitutional principles of gender equality, the court established a new interpretation of the alimony statute (C.C. 160), holding that the spouse seeking alimony has the burden of proving not only need, but also circumstances that prevent them from working to support themselves. Because this interpretation was new, the court found it would be unfair to deny the claim on the existing record and instead remanded the case to allow Barnes to present evidence on her inability to work.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant evolution in Louisiana's approach to post-divorce alimony, shifting the legal standard towards a more modern, gender-neutral framework. By imposing a duty on the alimony-seeking spouse to prove their inability to be self-supporting, the court moved away from traditional assumptions about spousal roles and aligned the law with constitutional principles against sex-based discrimination. This precedent prevents an able-bodied and employable ex-spouse from choosing not to work in order to create or prolong an alimony obligation. The case also firmly reinforces the public policy limitation on freedom of contract within marriage, affirming that parties cannot privately bargain away the fundamental, personal duties inherent in the marital relationship.
