Farwell v. Keaton
396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
An individual who voluntarily undertakes to aid an injured person has a duty to act with reasonable care. Furthermore, a special relationship, such as that between companions on a social venture, can create an affirmative duty to render aid to one who is in peril.
Facts:
- David Siegrist and Richard Farwell were companions on a social outing for an evening.
- After they followed two girls, a group of six boys chased them.
- Siegrist escaped unharmed, but the group caught and severely beat Farwell.
- Siegrist found Farwell injured underneath a car and applied ice to his head to relieve the pain.
- Siegrist then drove Farwell around to several drive-in restaurants for approximately two hours.
- During the drive, Farwell crawled into the back seat and fell asleep or lost consciousness.
- Around midnight, Siegrist drove to the home of Farwell's grandparents, parked the car, tried unsuccessfully to wake Farwell, and then left him alone in the vehicle.
- Farwell's grandparents discovered him the next morning; he was taken to a hospital and died three days later from an epidural hematoma.
Procedural Posture:
- Farwell's father (plaintiff) filed a wrongful death action against Siegrist (defendant) in the trial court.
- The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding $15,000 in damages.
- The defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied by the trial court.
- The defendant, as appellant, appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, finding as a matter of law that the defendant owed no duty to the deceased.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
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Issue:
Does a person have a legal duty to obtain medical assistance for a companion on a social venture who is severely injured, when that person knows or should know of the companion's peril and can render aid without endangering himself?
Opinions:
Majority - Levin, J.
Yes. A person has a legal duty to obtain medical assistance for an imperiled companion under these circumstances. First, by taking affirmative acts to aid Farwell (applying ice, taking control of the car), Siegrist voluntarily entered into a relationship that required him to act with reasonable care. Once performance of aid has begun, there is a duty to continue with care. Second, a special relationship existed between Siegrist and Farwell as companions on a common social undertaking. This relationship implies an understanding that one will render assistance to the other when in peril, creating an affirmative duty to act where one knows or should know of the danger and can help without endangering oneself.
Dissenting - Fitzgerald, J.
No. A person does not have a legal duty to obtain medical assistance for a companion under these circumstances. Siegrist did not voluntarily assume a duty of care, as his actions were minimal and did not worsen Farwell's condition. The facts within Siegrist's knowledge, as a layperson, would not indicate the necessity of immediate medical attention. Furthermore, the relationship of being friends on a social outing is not a 'special relationship' that imposes a legal duty to render aid. Elevating a moral obligation to a legal duty is inappropriate here, as the defendant's inaction (nonfeasance) cannot be the basis for negligence liability without a pre-existing duty.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for expanding the exceptions to the traditional American legal principle that there is no duty to rescue. The court broadened the definition of a 'special relationship' beyond established categories (like innkeeper-guest or carrier-passenger) to include 'companions on a social venture.' This creates a potential duty to aid among friends or acquaintances in situations where one previously did not exist. The ruling suggests that courts may find a legal duty to act where societal expectations and 'the commonly accepted code of social conduct' would impose a strong moral obligation.
