Farnam v. State
65 Cal. Comp. Cases 1270, 2000 Daily Journal DAR 12627, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1448 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
The firefighter's rule, as an application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine, bars a public safety officer from recovering damages for injuries caused by the negligence of another officer when they are jointly engaged in a hazardous activity that is inherent to their occupation.
Facts:
- Ronald Farnam, a Los Alamitos police officer, and Joseph Morrison, a California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer, participated in a multi-agency vehicle pursuit of a suspected felon.
- After the suspect's vehicle was stopped, Morrison arrived at the scene accompanied by his police dog, Barry.
- Morrison exited his vehicle holding Barry by a choke collar.
- Farnam was already on the scene, standing by the suspect's car with his gun drawn on the suspect.
- Morrison's dog, Barry, apparently mistook Farnam for the suspect.
- Barry broke free from Morrison's control and bit Farnam, causing injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Ronald Farnam filed a negligence action against Defendant Joseph Morrison and his employer, the California Highway Patrol, in a California superior court (trial court).
- Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding they were immune from liability under a government immunity statute.
- Plaintiff Ronald Farnam, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does the firefighter's rule, under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, bar a police officer from suing another officer from a different agency for injuries caused by the other officer's negligence during a joint operation to apprehend a suspect?
Opinions:
Majority - Rylaarsdam, J.
Yes. The firefighter's rule, which is a specific application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine, operates as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery. The court reasoned that the rule is not limited to the conduct that necessitated the officer's presence but extends to all risks inherent in the occupation. Relying heavily on the public policy rationale articulated in Calatayud v. State of California, the court held that imposing a duty of care between officers engaged in a joint operation would create conflicting duties, discourage inter-agency cooperation, and improperly shift the cost of such injuries from public compensation schemes to individual tort litigation. The court concluded that the hazard posed by a police dog during the apprehension of a felon is an inherent risk of the job that Officer Farnam was employed to confront, meaning Officer Morrison owed him no duty of care.
Dissenting - Bedsworth, J.
No. The firefighter's rule should not bar the claim because the majority is improperly creating a new judicial immunity that should be left to the Legislature. The dissent argued that the firefighter's rule, as explained in prior Supreme Court cases like Neighbarger, does not apply to 'independent acts of misconduct that are committed after the firefighter or police officer has arrived on the scene.' Morrison's negligent handling of his dog was such an independent act, occurring after Farnam was already on scene, and was not the conduct that necessitated Farnam's presence. Therefore, the rule does not apply in the first place, and the majority's reliance on the policy discussion in Calatayud is misplaced because that case concerned a narrow statutory exception, not the fundamental scope of the common law rule.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the application of the firefighter's rule to bar negligence claims between public safety officers from different agencies who are engaged in a joint operation. By prioritizing the public policy goals of fostering inter-agency cooperation and spreading costs, the court subordinates the individual officer's right to tort recovery. This precedent establishes that officers assume the risk of a colleague's negligence as an inherent danger of their profession, making it exceedingly difficult for an officer to sue another for on-duty injuries sustained during a shared emergency response, regardless of which officer's actions caused the harm.
