Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. To establish deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the official was subjectively aware of the risk and disregarded it, a standard akin to criminal recklessness.
Facts:
- Dee Farmer is a biological male diagnosed as a transsexual who projects feminine characteristics, having undergone estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants, and attempted testicle-removal surgery.
- The Bureau of Prisons' policy is to house preoperative transsexuals with inmates of the same biological sex.
- Before the events in question, Farmer had been segregated in at least one other penitentiary due to safety concerns.
- On March 9, 1989, Farmer was transferred for disciplinary reasons to the U.S. Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, a higher-security facility known for a violent environment.
- After an initial period in administrative segregation, prison officials placed Farmer into the general population at USP-Terre Haute.
- Within two weeks of being placed in the general population, Farmer was beaten and raped by another inmate in his cell.
Procedural Posture:
- Dee Farmer filed a Bivens complaint in U.S. District Court against federal prison officials, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
- The respondents (prison officials) moved for summary judgment.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to the respondents, concluding they lacked 'actual knowledge' of a potential danger to Farmer and therefore were not deliberately indifferent.
- Farmer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Seventh Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court's judgment without a written opinion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the proper test for deliberate indifference.
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Issue:
Does a prison official's failure to prevent harm to an inmate violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment only if the official has a subjective awareness of the substantial risk of serious harm?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Souter
Yes. A prison official's failure to prevent harm violates the Eighth Amendment only if the official has a subjective awareness of the risk. To be liable for 'deliberate indifference,' the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. The Court rejected an objective test (what a reasonable official 'should have known'), reasoning that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 'punishment,' which requires a culpable state of mind beyond mere negligence. This subjective recklessness standard can be proven through circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may infer an official's knowledge from the very obviousness of a risk.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
Justice Blackmun concurred, joining the Court's opinion because it sends a clear message to prison officials about their duty to protect inmates, but argued that the Court's reliance on a subjective state of mind is wrong. He contended that the precedent requiring subjective intent, Wilson v. Seiter, should be overruled because inhumane prison conditions are unconstitutional punishment regardless of any official's motivation or intent. The focus should be on the objective character of the punishment, not the subjective state of mind of the person inflicting it.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens concurred, stating that while he continues to believe an improper subjective motivation is not required to find an Eighth Amendment violation, he joined the majority opinion because it is faithful to the Court's existing precedents.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment only. He argued that, as an original matter, conditions of confinement are not 'punishment' under the Eighth Amendment unless imposed as part of a sentence. However, accepting the Court's precedent from Estelle v. Gamble, he agreed that a subjective standard is the correct one because an objective 'should have known' test is merely a negligence standard, which Estelle rightly rejected. He agreed with adopting a restrictive definition of deliberate indifference to contain what he sees as otherwise unbounded liability for prison officials.
Analysis:
This case is significant for resolving a circuit split and definitively establishing the 'subjective awareness' standard for deliberate indifference in Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. The ruling clarifies that officials cannot be held liable for risks they should have known about but did not, thereby protecting them from claims based on mere negligence. At the same time, the Court's allowance for knowledge to be inferred from obvious risks prevents officials from using feigned ignorance as a shield against liability. This decision solidifies the culpability requirement in prison conditions litigation, shaping the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs and the defense strategies for prison officials in all subsequent cases.
