Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority
511 A.2d 757, 510 Pa. 589, 1986 Pa. LEXIS 793 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
To toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff who commences an action by filing a writ of summons must then make a good-faith effort to effectuate prompt service; a prolonged delay caused by counsel's inadvertence, such as misplacing a file and forgetfulness, may fail to meet this standard.
Facts:
- A plaintiff allegedly suffered a slip and fall injury on February 2, 1980.
- The statute of limitations for the personal injury action was two years.
- On February 2, 1982, the final day of the limitations period, the plaintiffs' counsel, Farinacci, filed a praecipe for a writ of summons.
- Plaintiffs' counsel paid the Prothonotary for the writ, which was issued the next day.
- Counsel intended to immediately arrange for service but misplaced the case file for eight or nine days.
- After finding the file, counsel then forgot to take the necessary steps to have the sheriff serve the writ.
- On March 11, 1982, more than 30 days after the writ was issued, counsel finally paid the sheriff and had the writ reissued.
- The defendants, Beaver Authority, were personally served within the two weeks following March 11, 1982.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Farinacci filed a praecipe for writ of summons against defendants Beaver Authority in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, the trial court.
- Defendants filed preliminary objections arguing the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
- The Court of Common Pleas sustained the defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.
- Plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the dismissal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision in a memorandum opinion.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the state's highest court, granted the plaintiffs' petition for allocatur to review the case.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's counsel's inadvertent failure to promptly instruct and pay the sheriff for service of a writ of summons, due to misplacing a file and subsequent forgetfulness, constitute a lack of a good-faith effort to effectuate notice, thereby failing to toll the statute of limitations?
Opinions:
Majority - Flaherty, J.
Yes. A plaintiff's failure to make a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of the commencement of an action fails to toll the statute of limitations. The court clarified that the rule established in Lamp v. Heyman requires plaintiffs to refrain from conduct that stalls the legal process, which includes making a good-faith effort to provide notice to the defendant. While a brief delay from misplacing a file might be excusable, a subsequent delay of four weeks attributable solely to counsel's faulty memory does not constitute a good-faith effort. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs' inaction violated the Lamp rule and dismissing the action as barred by the statute of limitations.
Dissenting - Zappala, J.
No. The majority misinterprets and misapplies the standard from Lamp v. Heyman. Lamp requires a trial court to determine whether a plaintiff's delay was unreasonable and whether it resulted in prejudice to the defendant, neither of which the trial court found here. The record indicates the defendants were aware of the claim prior to the suit, negating any prejudice. Furthermore, the standard from Lamp is one of reasonableness, not the 'good faith' standard created by the majority. Punishing a plaintiff for counsel's mere inadvertence, without a finding of unreasonable delay or prejudice, is an improper application of the law.
Analysis:
This decision refines the standard set forth in Lamp v. Heyman, clarifying that even unintentional, negligent conduct by counsel can nullify the tolling of the statute of limitations. It establishes that 'good faith' is the operative standard, shifting the focus from the plaintiff's subjective intent to an objective evaluation of their diligence in pursuing service of process. The ruling places a significant burden on plaintiffs to act promptly after filing a writ, as simple forgetfulness or office mishaps will not excuse a failure to effectuate service. This precedent reinforces that trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a plaintiff's actions (or lack thereof) meet the good-faith requirement.
