Fare v. Michael C.
442 U.S. 707 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
A juvenile's request to speak with a probation officer during a custodial interrogation is not a per se invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The validity of a subsequent waiver of rights must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
Facts:
- Michael C., a 16.5-year-old, was implicated in a murder that occurred on January 19, 1976.
- At the time, Michael C. was on probation to the Juvenile Court, a status he had held since age 12, and had a record of several previous offenses.
- On February 4, 1976, police took Michael C. into custody for questioning about the murder.
- After being advised of his Miranda rights, Michael C. was asked if he wanted an attorney present, to which he responded, "Can I have my probation officer here?"
- Police denied the request to contact the probation officer but reiterated his right to an attorney.
- After the denial and further explanation of his rights, Michael C. agreed to talk to the police without an attorney present.
- During the subsequent interrogation, Michael C. made incriminating statements and drew sketches related to the murder.
- Michael C.'s probation officer had previously instructed him to get in touch with him immediately if he ever had a police contact.
Procedural Posture:
- Probation authorities filed a petition in California Juvenile Court, the court of first instance, alleging Michael C. committed murder.
- At a hearing in the Juvenile Court, respondent Michael C. moved to suppress his incriminating statements.
- The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Michael C. had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under the totality of the circumstances.
- The Supreme Court of California took the case by transfer from the California Court of Appeal.
- The Supreme Court of California reversed the Juvenile Court's decision, holding that Michael C.'s request for his probation officer was a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
- The State of California, the petitioner, successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the California Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a juvenile's request to speak with their probation officer during a custodial interrogation constitute a per se invocation of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Blackmun
No. A juvenile's request to speak to a probation officer is not a per se invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because a probation officer does not play the same unique, critical role as an attorney in the adversarial system. Unlike an attorney, whose sole duty is to protect a client's legal rights and whose communications are privileged, a probation officer is a state employee allied with law enforcement and has a duty to report the juvenile's wrongdoing. The per se rule from Miranda is justified by the lawyer's unique ability to protect Fifth Amendment rights, a role a probation officer cannot fulfill due to potential conflicts of interest. The proper approach to determine if a juvenile has waived their rights is to assess the totality of the circumstances, including the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. Applying this standard, Michael C.'s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. A juvenile's request for a probation officer should be treated as a per se assertion of their Fifth Amendment rights. The coercive pressures of custodial interrogation are heightened for juveniles, who are more likely to turn to a trusted adult figure for help rather than an unknown attorney. The California Supreme Court correctly identified that under state law, a probation officer serves as a 'trusted guardian figure' obligated to represent the juvenile's interests. A request for such adult assistance is inconsistent with a present desire to speak freely and functions as both an attempt to get advice and an invocation of the right to silence. The majority's decision withdraws Miranda's safeguards from the very individuals most in need of them.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Powell
No. While a request for a probation officer is not a per se invocation of Miranda rights, the judgment should be affirmed because, under the totality of the circumstances, this particular juvenile's confession was not voluntary. Respondent was an immature and emotional 16-year-old who was vulnerable to the skillful, repetitive interrogation he faced. When he asked for the one adult figure he was instructed to trust, the police refused and proceeded with a protracted interrogation. The police failed to exercise the 'greatest care' required when obtaining a confession from a juvenile, rendering the subsequent admission involuntary and inadmissible.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limited the scope of Miranda's per se invocation rule, clarifying that the rule's protection applies uniquely to a request for an attorney. By rejecting the extension of the rule to probation officers or other trusted adults, the Court prevented a potential broadening of Miranda that could have complicated custodial interrogations of juveniles. The holding solidifies the 'totality of the circumstances' test as the controlling standard for evaluating a juvenile's waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, requiring a case-by-case analysis rather than a rigid, categorical rule. This places a greater burden on lower courts to carefully weigh factors like age and experience when determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession.
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