Pearl Bei Fei Fang v. United States
140 F. 3d 1238 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) immunizes the government from liability for policy-based decisions, such as the allocation of resources and personnel, but does not shield it from claims of negligence arising from the on-the-ground, operational performance of medical services by its employees.
Facts:
- On September 3, 1994, Freda Fang was a passenger in a Toyota Camry traveling through Sequoia National Park when the car's brakes failed.
- The vehicle left the road, went over an embankment, and fell approximately 210 feet down a mountainside.
- Fang was ejected from the car during the accident.
- Two National Park Service EMTs, Craig Cavanna and Colleen Boes, responded from a nearby ranger station.
- Upon reaching Fang, the EMTs cleared her airway and administered oxygen but did not immediately attempt to stabilize her spine.
- Approximately fifteen minutes after the accident, Fang stopped breathing, and the EMTs began to administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
- After additional support arrived, Fang was placed in a cervical collar and on a backboard and transported up the mountain, a process taking about 55 minutes during which CPR was continuous.
- Fang was pronounced dead upon reaching the top of the hill, with the cause of death listed as a 'cervical fracture'.
Procedural Posture:
- Pearl Bei Fei Fang, the decedent's mother, first filed a wrongful death action in California Superior Court against Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
- Fang then filed a separate suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, adding claims against the United States for negligence by National Park Service employees.
- The United States filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claims were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the United States.
- Following the dismissal of the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the remaining state law claims.
- Fang appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the dismissal of the state claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the appeals were consolidated.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act bar claims against the United States for alleged negligence by National Park Service EMTs in their on-the-ground administration of medical care, such as spinal stabilization and CPR?
Opinions:
Majority - T.G. Nelson, Circuit Judge
No, the discretionary function exception does not bar claims for the negligent administration of medical care. While policy decisions regarding resource allocation are protected, operational decisions made by professionals in the course of their duties, such as how to administer medical treatment, are not the type of conduct Congress intended to shield from tort liability. The court applied the two-part test from Berkovitz v. United States. Under the first prong, the court assumed the EMTs' actions were discretionary because the specific protocols for spinal immobilization did not apply to them, and CPR technique involves professional judgment. However, under the second prong, the court found that these judgments were not grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Decisions on whether to stabilize a spine or how to perform CPR are medical judgments based on training and expertise, not policy analysis. In contrast, claims regarding the failure to have certain equipment at the station are barred because decisions about resource allocation across the park are policy-based judgments protected by the exception.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the boundary between protected policy judgments and unprotected operational negligence under the FTCA's discretionary function exception. It establishes that while the government is immune from suits challenging its high-level resource allocation decisions, it can be held liable for the professional negligence of its employees in carrying out their duties. This holding ensures that government professionals, like medical personnel, are held to a standard of care in their treatment of the public, preventing the discretionary function exception from becoming a blanket shield for all government employee actions. The decision is significant for future tort claims against federal agencies that provide direct services, reinforcing that professional judgment in the field is distinct from protected administrative policy.
