Fain v. Commonwealth
78 Ky. 183, 1879 Ky. LEXIS 84 (1879)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A person cannot be held criminally responsible for an act committed while entirely unconscious, and a subjective good-faith belief in self-defense, even if objectively unreasonable, may excuse actions taken in a semi-conscious or deluded state resulting from an abnormal physical condition like somnolentia.
Facts:
- Appellant and his friend, George Welch, arrived at the Veranda Hotel one cold evening in February and fell asleep in the public room.
- Welch awoke and asked Henry Smith, a hotel porter, to wake the Appellant to get a bed for them.
- Smith repeatedly shook the Appellant, eventually harder and harder, causing the Appellant to stir, refuse to go to bed, and tell Smith to leave him alone.
- Smith, insisting he needed to close the hotel, continued holding the Appellant by his coat and lifted him up; as the Appellant rose, he drew a pistol and fired three shots, killing Smith.
- After the shooting, the Appellant was subdued, appeared frightened, asked who he shot, and expressed sorrow upon learning it was Smith.
- The Appellant and Smith were strangers with no prior acquaintance, and the Appellant, known for his peaceable character, had no apparent motive to harm Smith.
- The Appellant had a history of sleepwalking since infancy and was prone to violence and confusion, sometimes resisting as if assaulted, when suddenly aroused from sleep.
- The Appellant had recently lost considerable sleep due to his children's dangerous illness and had borrowed the pistol that morning for self-defense due to a prior threat, as he was required to go near where the person who threatened him lived.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant was indicted for the murder of Henry Smith in a trial court.
- The trial court jury found the appellant guilty of manslaughter and sentenced him to two years in the penitentiary.
- The appellant appealed the trial court's judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court err by excluding evidence that the defendant had a history of somnambulism, suffered from sleep deprivation, and had received a prior threat, which evidence was offered to show he acted unconsciously or under a deluded belief of danger when he shot the deceased?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Cofer
Yes, the trial court erred by excluding evidence related to the appellant's somnambulism, sleep deprivation, and the prior threat, as this evidence was pertinent to proving he acted unconsciously or under a good-faith, albeit deluded, belief of self-defense. The court reasoned that a fundamental principle of criminal law dictates that there can be no criminality in the absence of criminal intention (`mens rea`). Citing medical and medico-legal authorities (such as Dr. Ray, Wharton & Stille, Taylor, and Brown), the court recognized conditions like somnambulism and somnolentia where individuals can perform acts, including homicides, while unconscious or in a transitional state between sleeping and waking, thus lacking criminal intent. If the appellant was unconscious when he fired the shot, it cannot be imputed as a crime. Furthermore, if he was partially conscious but, upon being suddenly aroused and held by a stranger, imagined he was under attack and shot in good faith belief of necessity to preserve his life or person, he is not guilty. In such a half-awakened state, he cannot be expected to have reasonable grounds for his belief, as his perceptive faculties are deranged. The evidence of his children's illness and his recent sleep loss should have been admitted to show he may have been unconscious or partly so, making him unable to understand his situation. Similarly, evidence of the prior threat was admissible because such a threat could contribute to his predisposition to imagine an assault and violently resist, especially when awakened by a stranger. The court acknowledged that while carrying a weapon knowing of his propensity for violence while asleep might be a "grave breach of social duty," the law only punishes for overt acts by responsible moral agents, and thus, if the act was unconscious, it cannot be punished.
Analysis:
This case is legally significant for expanding the understanding of criminal responsibility beyond traditional notions of `mens rea` and insanity, by acknowledging "somnolentia" and "somnambulism" as altered states of consciousness that can negate criminal intent or justify a subjective, albeit objectively unreasonable, claim of self-defense. It underscores the critical role of medical expert testimony in informing legal determinations about a defendant's state of mind, especially when that state is altered by non-volitional factors like sleep or a transition between sleep and waking. The ruling broadens the scope of exculpatory defenses, suggesting that a lack of full consciousness can be equivalent to a lack of criminal culpability, even in the absence of a traditional mental illness diagnosis.
