Fahy v. Connecticut
375 U.S. 85 (1963)
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Rule of Law:
The erroneous admission of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure is not harmless error if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the conviction.
Facts:
- Between 4 and 5 a.m. on February 1, 1960, swastikas were painted with black paint on a synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut.
- At approximately 4:40 a.m., a police officer, Lindwall, stopped a car being driven without its lights on by Fahy, with a passenger named Arnold, about a block from the synagogue.
- During the stop, Officer Lindwall discovered a can of black paint and a paintbrush under the front seat of Fahy's car but released the men.
- After learning of the vandalism at the synagogue later that morning, Officer Lindwall went to Fahy's home.
- Without obtaining a search warrant, Officer Lindwall entered Fahy's garage and seized the can of paint and the paintbrush from Fahy's car.
- Approximately two hours later, police returned with a valid warrant and arrested Fahy and Arnold.
- Upon his arrest, Fahy made incriminating statements, referring to the painting as 'Oh, that?' and a 'prank' done 'for kicks.'
- At the police station, Fahy was read Arnold's full confession and confirmed its accuracy, stating 'the story was as I had it from Mr. Arnold.'
Procedural Posture:
- Fahy was convicted of wilfully injuring a public building in a Connecticut state court following a bench trial.
- At trial, the court admitted a can of paint and a paintbrush into evidence over Fahy's objection.
- Fahy (appellant) appealed the conviction to the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search and seizure and was erroneously admitted, but it affirmed the conviction on the grounds that the admission constituted harmless error.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Fahy's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the determination of harmless error.
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Issue:
Does the erroneous admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence constitute harmless error when there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
No, the erroneous admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence does not constitute harmless error when there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction. The question is not whether there was sufficient other evidence to convict, but whether the illegally admitted evidence itself might have influenced the outcome. In this case, the paint and brush were tangible, incriminating evidence used to corroborate officer testimony and form the basis of expert opinion linking Fahy to the crime. Furthermore, Fahy was denied the opportunity to argue that his confession was prompted by the police confronting him with the illegally seized evidence. The cumulative effect of this evidence was prejudicial and therefore cannot be considered harmless.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes, the erroneous admission of this evidence was harmless error. The Court should not be re-evaluating the factual findings of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, which found the error to be harmless. The evidence of the paint and brush was, at most, cumulative, as the transcript reveals overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt, including their immediate and free confessions. Fahy's defense was not that he didn't commit the act, but that the act did not constitute the crime charged, making evidence that proved he committed the act non-prejudicial to his actual defense. The harmless-error rule's application turns on the effect of the evidence in a particular case, not the reason for its inadmissibility, and its use here does not undermine the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
Analysis:
This case establishes the federal standard for what constitutes harmless error when evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is admitted at trial. It shifts the inquiry away from whether sufficient untainted evidence exists to sustain the conviction, focusing instead on whether the tainted evidence itself had a 'reasonable possibility' of contributing to the verdict. This standard significantly strengthens the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio by making it more difficult for prosecutors to argue that constitutional violations were harmless. The decision sets the foundation for the more formally articulated constitutional harmless error test later established in Chapman v. California.
