Fagan v. Atnalta, Inc.
376 S.E.2d 204, 189 Ga. App. 460, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1419 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A business invitee who voluntarily and deliberately interjects themselves into an obvious and known dangerous situation assumes the risk of injury, thereby precluding recovery from the premises owner for alleged negligence.
Facts:
- Mitchell J. Fagan was a patron at The Beer Mug, dating the waitress, on the evening of February 26, 1985.
- The bar was staffed by a female bartender, a female waitress, and a cook, with Fagan and a few other customers present.
- An altercation occurred among four customers playing pool in a separate area of the bar.
- The female bartender and waitress attempted to get the belligerent customers to leave via the back door.
- Fagan and another customer named 'Bob' gratuitously moved to a position behind the two women.
- One of the men being forced to leave grabbed the bartender by the collar.
- Fagan grabbed the bartender from the rear to prevent her from being pulled outside the bar.
- The belligerent men then turned their attention to Fagan, pulled him outside, and administered a severe beating.
- Fagan was aware of prior assault incidents at The Beer Mug and knew the bar was staffed by only two women; he testified that he knew he would be in 'big trouble' if a fight developed.
- The bartender stated she did not ask Fagan or Bob for assistance and remarked that if Fagan 'hadn't have been there he wouldn't have gotten beat up so bad.'
Procedural Posture:
- Mitchell J. Fagan brought a tort action against Atnalta, owner of The Beer Mug, for injuries he sustained.
- Atnalta filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court (court of first instance).
- The trial court granted Atnalta’s motion for summary judgment.
- Fagan (appellant) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
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Issue:
Does a bar patron assume the risk of injury as a matter of law when they voluntarily and deliberately intervene in a physical altercation between bar staff and other patrons, knowing the general dangers of the establishment and that such intervention could lead to personal injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Birdsong, Chief Judge
Yes, Fagan assumed the risk of injury when he voluntarily and deliberately interjected himself into the volatile confrontation. The court applied the three-element test for assumption of risk: (1) a hazard inconsistent with the invitee's safety, (2) the invitee's knowledge and appreciation of the danger, and (3) the invitee's acquiescence or willingness to proceed despite the danger. Fagan’s own testimony indicated he recognized the danger and voluntarily thrust himself into the melee without being asked. He had a clear choice to stay out of the management's business in expelling disorderly customers but chose to assist. An adult of ordinary intelligence is presumed to appreciate obvious danger and will be held to be aware of the manifest risk of joining an affray as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Atnalta.
Dissenting - Deen, Presiding Judge
No, the doctrine of rescue should be applied in this case, which would preclude summary judgment for the appellee. Presiding Judge Deen argued that Fagan’s actions, though perhaps an antiquated act of chivalry, warranted reconsideration under the doctrine of rescue, which permits recovery for injuries incurred while attempting to save another from a peril created by the defendant’s negligence. The dissent suggested that the court's interpretation should not punish such 'gallant' actions.
Dissenting - Beasley, Judge
No, the issue of assumption of risk, particularly concerning Fagan's intervention, should have been determined by a jury, not as a matter of law. The dissenting judge argued that the majority improperly decided an issue not fully contemplated by the trial court or the parties, which had focused on Fagan's 'equal knowledge' of the general dangerous conditions of the bar by merely patronizing it. The doctrine of rescue, which contemplates an assumption of risk but still allows recovery unless the rescuer's actions are reckless or wanton, should have been considered by a jury. Furthermore, whether Fagan had truly 'equal knowledge' of the danger compared to the proprietor (considering the number and ferocity of prior incidents) and whether the bar owner could reasonably foresee such an attack and adequately protect patrons, were also questions for a jury, especially given evidence of the bar's history of violence and lack of sufficient security personnel.
Analysis:
This case strictly applies the assumption of risk doctrine, particularly emphasizing the 'voluntary' and 'deliberate' nature of a plaintiff's actions. It highlights that even in situations where a defendant might be negligent (e.g., failing to provide adequate security), a plaintiff's decision to interject themselves into an obvious danger can be a complete bar to recovery. The dissent's strong invocation of the 'rescue doctrine' suggests a tension between protecting proprietors from liability for patrons' voluntary acts and encouraging heroic intervention in dangerous situations. Future cases involving patron interventions will likely turn on the clarity of the danger, the plaintiff's knowledge of that danger, and the voluntariness of their actions, potentially limiting the applicability of the rescue doctrine in Georgia for non-professional rescuers unless the actions are less direct or clearly invited.
