No. The company doesn't have to pay. The law says you're only responsible if your mistake is a direct cause of the damage. Here, the equipment failure only put the ship in a difficult situation, which the captain completely solved. The captain's later decision to stop checking his location and turn toward a reef was a new, independent, and unforeseeable mistake. This 'superseding cause' was the sole reason the ship was destroyed, cutting off any blame that could be traced back to the broken equipment.

Yes, the old rules about who caused the accident and if it could have been predicted still apply. We decided this because these rules are important for limiting who can be blamed for an accident and work well with the new way of dividing up fault. We didn't change these rules when we changed how damages are split up in sea accident cases. It makes sense to only divide up blame among people whose actions actually caused the accident. The idea of a 'superseding cause' - something that happens later and becomes the main cause of the accident - still works with this system. In this case, the captain's very careless actions were the main cause of the accident, so the other people being sued aren't responsible for paying for the damages.

I disagree with the decision because it puts all the blame on the captain even though other parties also helped cause the problem. It’s like saying only one person is at fault when several people made mistakes that led to the accident, and I believe everyone who played a part should share the blame.

I don’t agree with the decision because it only blames the captain and ignores that others made mistakes too. It’s like saying one kid is completely to blame for a broken toy when all the kids had a hand in it. I believe everyone who did something wrong should take some of the blame because every mistake helped cause the accident.

No. The adoption of the comparative fault principle in admiralty does not displace the doctrines of proximate and superseding cause. A system that apportions damages based on comparative fault does so only among tortfeasors whose actions were proximate causes of an injury. The Court's decision in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., which established comparative fault in admiralty, did not address or eliminate the fundamental requirement of proximate causation. The superseding cause doctrine, which applies when an injury is brought about by a later, unforeseeable cause of independent origin, is a facet of proximate cause that remains good law. When a plaintiff's own extraordinary negligence is a superseding cause, it breaks the chain of causation from the defendant's initial negligence, precluding any apportionment of fault and barring the plaintiff's recovery entirely. This principle is a necessary limitation on liability and applies equally to claims in tort and contract.

Yes. The requirement of legal or 'proximate' causation, and the related 'superseding cause' doctrine, apply in admiralty notwithstanding our adoption of the comparative fault principle because these doctrines serve as necessary limitations on liability and are compatible with the comparative fault system. The proximate causation requirement was not before us in Reliable Transfer, and we did not suggest that the requirement was inapplicable in admiralty. There is nothing internally inconsistent in a system that apportions damages based upon comparative fault only among tortfeasors whose actions were proximate causes of an injury. The superseding cause doctrine can be reconciled with comparative negligence. Superseding cause operates to cut off the liability of an admittedly negligent defendant, and there is properly no apportionment of comparative fault where there is an absence of proximate causation. The finding that Captain Coyne's extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of Exxon's injury suffices to cut off respondents' liability for that injury on a contractual breach of warranty theory as well. The decision of the lower courts that Captain Coyne's extraordinary negligence was the sole proximate cause of the loss of the Houston is affirmed.

I dissent because the Court’s majority opinion improperly isolates Captain Coyne’s actions as the sole proximate cause of the loss, neglecting the contributory roles played by the respondents. In my view the trial court’s findings should have allowed a sharing of liability given that the respondents’ conduct also created an environment in which the accident could occur because their oversight and actions were intertwined with the events leading to the mishap. This interpretation of the proximate causation doctrine diverges from the majority’s rigid application that entirely exculpates the respondents, thereby undermining a more balanced legal assessment of fault in admiralty cases.

I dissent because the majority’s decision adopts an overly narrow reading of the superseding cause doctrine by completely disregarding the defendants’ contributions to the chain of events. I am convinced that attributing full liability solely to Captain Coyne’s actions is legally unsound because it fails to account for the multifaceted nature of proximate cause, where multiple parties bear responsibility because their actions also set the stage for the incident. This approach differs from the majority view by insisting that fault should be apportioned rather than concentrated in a single, intervening act.

Exxon Co., USA v. Sofec, Inc.

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