No, it's not against the Constitution. The Court explained that the Constitution's rules for a regular jury trial are for normal crimes, not for breaking the laws of war. When people from an enemy country sneak into the U.S. without uniforms to cause destruction, they are considered 'unlawful combatants'—basically spies or saboteurs, not regular soldiers. The laws of war have always allowed special military courts to handle these cases without a jury. The Court said that even the saboteur who was a U.S. citizen could be tried this way because he chose to fight for the enemy.

Yes, the President has the power under the Constitution and U.S. laws to order enemy fighters to be tried by a military court for breaking the rules of war. The military court in this case was made properly. The charges against these people are the kinds of charges the President can order to be tried by a military court. These people are being held legally to be tried by the military court. They haven't shown a good reason why they should be let go.

The Constitution gives the President, as the head of the military, the power to fight a war that Congress has declared. This includes the power to carry out laws about punishing people who break the rules of war. Congress has said that military courts can try people for breaking the rules of war.

The rules of war treat lawful and unlawful fighters differently. Lawful fighters can be captured and held as prisoners of war. Unlawful fighters can also be captured and held, but they can also be tried and punished by military courts for breaking the rules that make them unlawful fighters. These people are enemies who came into our country secretly, without uniforms, to destroy things. So they are unlawful fighters and can be tried by a military court.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution didn't change the rules about who gets a jury trial. These people can't demand a jury trial, because the crimes they are charged with are not the kind that required a jury trial under the old common law. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments didn't extend the right to a jury trial to cases tried by military courts.

The President's order to try these enemy fighters by military court is legal. The military court is set up properly. These people are being held legally and haven't shown a good reason why they should be let go.

Per Curiam (J.) explains that the Court agrees with the decision because the President has special power during war to handle dangerous threats. This means that people accused of acts against the country, like enemy spies or saboteurs, can be tried in a military court instead of a regular court. The military commission was set up properly because the law gives the President that power, so the petitioners are kept in custody and their request for a regular court review is denied.

No. The President's order for trial by military commission does not violate the Constitution. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not extend the right to a jury trial to cases involving offenses against the law of war, which are traditionally tried by military tribunals. The Court distinguished between 'lawful combatants,' who are subject to capture as prisoners of war, and 'unlawful combatants,' who are subject to trial and punishment by military commissions. Petitioners' acts of secretly passing through military lines in civilian dress for the purpose of committing hostile acts constituted them as unlawful combatants under the law of war. Even petitioner Haupt's U.S. citizenship does not afford him the right to a civil trial, as citizens who associate themselves with the enemy and engage in unlawful belligerency are subject to the same consequences as alien enemies. The Court also distinguished this case from *Ex parte Milligan*, noting that Milligan was a non-belligerent civilian, whereas the petitioners were enemy belligerents acting under the direction of an enemy government.

Yes, the President has the authority under the Constitution and laws of the United States to order the trial of enemy belligerents by a military commission for offenses against the law of war, and the military commission in this case was lawfully constituted. The charges against the petitioners allege offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a military commission. The petitioners are held in lawful custody for trial before the military commission, and they have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus. 

The Constitution invests the President, as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has declared and to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress defining and punishing offenses against the law of nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of war. By the Articles of War, Congress has explicitly provided for the trial of offenses against the law of war before military commissions. 

The law of war draws a distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war. Unlawful combatants, in addition to being subject to capture and detention, are also subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. Petitioners, being enemies who with the purpose of destroying war utilities entered or remained within our territory without uniform, are unlawful combatants and are subject to trial and punishment by a military commission for violations of the law of war.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not enlarge the right to jury trial. Petitioners cannot demand a jury trial, because they were charged with offenses not required to be tried by jury at common law. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission or to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be tried only in the civil courts.

The President's Order to try enemy belligerents for offenses against the law of war is a lawful order and the Commission is lawfully constituted. The petitioners are held in lawful custody and have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus.

Per Curiam (J.) delivers the opinion of the Court in a concise per curiam statement. The Court holds that the military commission was lawfully constituted because the President, under his wartime authority as Commander in Chief, is empowered to direct the trial of enemy belligerents for offenses against the law of war. The petitioners’ charges, being of a nature not traditionally requiring trial by jury, fall squarely within this statutory and constitutional framework because their actions as enemy invaders are inherently hostile. Accordingly, the District Court’s orders are affirmed and the petitioners’ claims for habeas relief are denied because the legal bases for operating the military commission remain intact under both the Constitution and the applicable statutes.

Ex parte Quirin

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