Ex Parte Presse
554 So. 2d 406 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, a man claiming to be the biological father of a child conceived and born during the mother's marriage to another man does not have standing to challenge the presumed father's paternity as long as the presumed father maintains his paternal status, prioritizing the weightier public policy interest in protecting the sanctity of existing family relationships.
Facts:
- Norman J. Presse, Jr. and Jean Ann (Presse) Koenemann married in Louisiana in 1973.
- The couple moved to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1975.
- While living in Tuscaloosa, Jean Ann engaged in an adulterous affair with Dr. Lynn C. Koenemann.
- Jean Ann used birth control when engaging in sex with Norman but not with Dr. Koenemann, and subsequently became pregnant.
- After the Presse couple returned to Louisiana in 1977, Jean Ann gave birth to Shelly Rene Presse.
- Norman J. Presse and Jean Ann lived together as husband and wife until January 1980, when their marriage ended in divorce in Louisiana.
- In March 1980, Jean Ann married Dr. Koenemann.
- In May 1980, when Shelly was approximately 3 years old, her primary custody was transferred to Jean Ann, and Norman J. Presse was granted liberal visitation rights, which he regularly used, and was required to pay $50 per month in child support.
- Shelly lived with Jean Ann and Dr. Koenemann, referred to Dr. Koenemann as "Daddy," and called Norman J. Presse "Norman."
- Blood tests conducted at the Koenemanns' request indicated that Norman J. Presse lacked a red cell antigen present in Shelly and absent in Jean Ann, excluding him as Shelly's biological father, and showed a 99% probability that Dr. Lynn Koenemann was Shelly's biological father.
Procedural Posture:
- Jean Ann Koenemann and Dr. Lynn Koenemann filed a verified complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of paternity and a petition for modification of the divorce decree in a trial court.
- The trial court ruled that Dr. Koenemann was the biological father of Shelly and ordered the amendment of the child's birth certificate; it also awarded Norman J. Presse occasional visitation privileges.
- Norman J. Presse, Jr. appealed the trial court's judgment to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals (Presse was appellant, Koenemanns were appellees).
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Norman J. Presse, Jr. (petitioner) sought certiorari review from the Supreme Court of Alabama, which granted the petition.
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Issue:
Does a man claiming to be the father of a child conceived and born during the marriage of its mother to another man have standing under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act to initiate an action to establish that he is the child's father, where the presumed father persists in the presumption that he is the father?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Jones
No, a man claiming to be the biological father of a child conceived and born during the mother's marriage to another man does not have standing under the UPA to initiate a paternity action when the presumed father (the husband at birth) maintains his paternal status. The court interprets the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) as a comprehensive statutory framework intended to promote full equality for all children and protect the sanctity of family relationships. Norman J. Presse falls under the primary "presumed father" category (§ 26-17-5(a)(1)) as he was married to Shelly's mother when Shelly was born. The court rejected Dr. Koenemann's argument that he qualified as a presumed father under § 26-17-5(a)(4) (receiving the child into his home and holding her out as his child), noting that he did so pursuant to a custody order, Shelly bore the Presse surname, and Norman J. Presse consistently exercised his visitation rights and never disavowed paternity. The court reasoned that allowing Dr. Koenemann to use this section would circumvent the five-year statute of limitations applicable to other presumptive categories, concluding that § 26-17-5(a)(4) is intended for a man not married to the child's mother. Even if conflicting presumptions arose, § 26-17-5(b) requires that the presumption founded upon "weightier considerations of public policy and logic" control. The court determined that the public policy considerations supporting Norman J. Presse's paternity as the husband during conception and birth were significantly "weightier" than any supporting Dr. Koenemann's claim, citing the ancient presumption of legitimacy. The court referenced Ex parte Anonymous (Chief Justice Torbert's dissent) and Michael H. v. Gerald D. (U.S. Supreme Court plurality opinion), emphasizing the historical protection of the marital family against claims by biological fathers and concluding that Alabama's UPA, through § 26-17-6(c), does not grant standing to a biological father when there is an existing presumed father. The court held that severing Norman J. Presse's relationship would frustrate the UPA's purpose and that Dr. Koenemann's interest was outweighed by the state's substantial interest in the child's psychological stability, general welfare, and legitimacy.
Dissenting - Justice Maddox
Yes, a biological father should have standing to establish his paternity, especially when the child's mother identifies him, scientific tests confirm his paternity, and he has established a family relationship with the child. The majority's decision creates an irrebuttable presumption for the marital husband, effectively disregarding conclusive scientific evidence and the real-world family dynamic where Shelly refers to Dr. Koenemann as "Daddy" and Norman J. Presse as "Norman." This approach, according to the dissent, sets back paternity law and negatively impacts children's rights to support and inheritance from their biological fathers. The dissent contended that the majority misread Michael H. v. Gerald D., distinguishing it by pointing out that the marital family in Michael H. was intact, the biological father had not married the mother, and Justice Stevens' concurrence suggested a "liberty interest" could exist for a natural father in different factual contexts. Justice Maddox argued that Dr. Koenemann fits the presumed father category under § 26-17-5(a)(4) because he received Shelly into his home and openly held her out as his child, making his action timely. When conflicting presumptions arise, § 26-17-5(b) requires considering "public policy and logic, as evidenced by the facts." The dissent argued the majority ignored "logic" and the "facts" by implicitly holding the marital presumption always prevails, despite modern scientific advancements in paternity testing. The primary concern should be the child's best interest, and it is not psychologically stabilizing for Shelly to be legally bound to a non-biological father when her biological father is present and willing. The UPA's objective is to promote equality and ensure paternal support. The dissent advocated for a "developed relationship" test, balancing emotional attachments, daily association, financial support, and formal ties, which would protect genuine family units and prevent outsiders from interfering, while also safeguarding a biological father who has established a significant relationship. The majority's decision denies Dr. Koenemann due process and could lead to situations where a non-biological "presumed father" is forced to support a child while the willing biological father is denied that right.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens the marital presumption of paternity in Alabama, prioritizing the legal and social stability of existing marital families over biological truth when the presumed father actively maintains his role. It demonstrates a judicial reluctance to disrupt established family units, even in the face of conclusive scientific evidence of non-paternity for the presumed father and clear biological paternity for another. The decision limits the standing of biological fathers to assert paternity under the UPA, particularly when a child was born within a marriage and the husband has not disavowed his paternal status. It suggests a narrow interpretation of who constitutes a 'presumed father' for standing purposes in cases of conflicting presumptions, prioritizing the marital presumption as weightier public policy, thereby reinforcing the traditional definition of family within the legal system.
