Ex parte Lévitt
302 U.S. 633 (1937)
Rule of Law:
A private individual must demonstrate a direct and personal injury resulting from an executive or legislative action to have standing to challenge that action in court; a generalized grievance shared with all members of the public is insufficient.
Facts:
- The President of the United States appointed Hugo Black to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
- The United States Senate confirmed the appointment.
- Albert Lévitt, a citizen and a member of the Supreme Court bar, believed the appointment was unconstitutional.
- Lévitt alleged that Justice Black was ineligible for the office under Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
- Lévitt also alleged that there was no vacancy on the Court for which a lawful appointment could be made.
- Lévitt did not assert that he had sustained any direct injury distinct from that of the general public as a result of the appointment.
Procedural Posture:
- Albert Lévitt filed a motion for leave to file a petition directly with the Supreme Court of the United States, acting as a court of first instance.
- The petition sought an order requiring Justice Hugo Black to show cause why he should be permitted to serve as an Associate Justice.
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Issue:
Does a private individual, whose only asserted interest is that of a citizen and member of the Supreme Court bar, have standing to challenge the constitutional validity of a Supreme Court Justice's appointment?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A private individual lacks standing to challenge the validity of a justice's appointment when their only claimed interest is a general one shared with the public at large. It is an established principle that for a private person to invoke the power of the judiciary, they must show they have sustained, or are in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental action. A general interest common to all members of the public, such as that of a citizen or member of the bar, is not a sufficient basis to confer standing. The Court cites a consistent line of precedent, including Massachusetts v. Mellon, to affirm that federal courts do not decide abstract questions or rule on the validity of governmental action at the request of individuals who cannot demonstrate a particularized harm.
Analysis:
This case serves as a concise and powerful affirmation of the doctrine of standing, specifically barring lawsuits based on a 'generalized grievance.' By denying the petitioner's motion, the Court reinforced the constitutional limit on judicial power, ensuring that federal courts adjudicate only actual cases or controversies involving parties with a concrete and personal stake in the outcome. This decision protects the separation of powers by preventing the judiciary from becoming a forum for any citizen to air political or ideological objections to the actions of the executive and legislative branches. It solidifies the 'injury-in-fact' requirement as a critical threshold for entering federal court.
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