Ex Parte Garland
71 U.S. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, 4 Wall. 333 (1867)
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Rule of Law:
A law that excludes individuals from a profession based on past conduct for which they cannot atone acts as a punishment and is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. Furthermore, Congress cannot use such legislative acts to diminish the effect of a full presidential pardon.
Facts:
- In the December term of 1860, A. H. Garland was admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor of the U.S. Supreme Court.
- In May 1861, Garland's home state of Arkansas seceded from the Union and joined the Confederacy.
- Following his state's secession, Garland served as both a representative and a senator in the Congress of the Confederate States.
- On January 24, 1865, the U.S. Congress passed an act requiring attorneys in federal courts to take an oath stating they had never voluntarily borne arms against the U.S. or held any office in a hostile government.
- In July 1865, President Andrew Johnson granted Garland a full pardon for all offenses he committed by participating in the rebellion.
- Garland sought to resume his practice before the Supreme Court but was unable to take the required oath due to his service in the Confederate government.
Procedural Posture:
- A. H. Garland filed a petition directly with the U.S. Supreme Court.
- In his petition, Garland requested permission to continue practicing as an attorney before the Court without taking the oath prescribed by the Act of January 24, 1865.
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Issue:
Does a federal statute that prevents an attorney from practicing in federal court unless he swears an oath that he never engaged in past hostilities against the United States operate as an unconstitutional bill of attainder and an ex post facto law, and does it infringe upon the President's pardon power?
Opinions:
Majority - Field, J.
Yes. The statute is unconstitutional because excluding a person from a profession for past conduct is a punishment, and this law functions as a legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial, making it a prohibited bill of attainder. It also operates as an ex post facto law by imposing a new punishment for past acts. The Court reasoned that admission to the bar is a judicial, not legislative, function and that the right to practice law is not a mere privilege but a right that can only be revoked for misconduct after due process. Critically, the President's pardon power is plenary; a full pardon erases the offense and all its attendant penalties and disabilities. Congress cannot constitutionally pass a law that limits the effect of a pardon by inflicting punishment for the pardoned offense under the guise of a professional qualification.
Dissenting - Miller, J.
No. The statute is a valid exercise of congressional power because the right to practice law is a privilege, not an absolute right, and Congress may prescribe qualifications for that privilege. The Court's dissent argued that requiring loyalty to the government is a reasonable qualification for attorneys, who are officers of the court and vital to the administration of justice. The statute is not a bill of attainder because it does not single out specific individuals for punishment, nor is it an ex post facto law because it imposes a qualification for office, not a criminal penalty. Furthermore, the President's pardon power applies to criminal punishments but does not override the legislature's power to set neutral qualifications for holding a position of public trust.
Analysis:
This decision is a landmark ruling on the scope of the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses, establishing that these protections apply even when a punishment is disguised as a civil or professional qualification. It reinforces the separation of powers by affirming the judiciary's authority over the legal profession against legislative encroachment. The case also provides a robust defense of the President's pardon power, holding that its effect is to restore all rights and that Congress cannot pass laws to circumvent it, which became a key precedent in post-conflict legal reconciliation.
