Ex Parte Fraley
109 P. 295 (1910)
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Rule of Law:
A homicide committed upon a provocation given months prior is murder, not manslaughter, as an unreasonable period of time between the provocation and the killing constitutes sufficient cooling time as a matter of law, negating a heat-of-passion defense.
Facts:
- Approximately nine to ten months before the killing, Dan Parker shot and killed the son of M. F. Fraley.
- Parker was tried for the killing of Fraley's son and was acquitted.
- On April 11, 1910, Parker was sitting on a railing in front of a drug store in Pawhuska.
- Fraley approached Parker, said "Hello, Dan," and immediately fired two shots into him.
- After Parker fell from the railing to the ground, Fraley walked around an obstruction and fired four more shots into Parker's body.
- Fraley then walked away, but returned, put his pistol to Parker's head, and stated, "You damned son of a bitch, I told you I'd kill you; you killed my boy."
- After Parker fell, his own pistol fell from his pocket, but there was no evidence he ever attempted to draw the weapon.
Procedural Posture:
- A complaint was filed against petitioner M. F. Fraley in a justice of the peace court in Osage County, charging him with the murder of Dan Parker.
- A warrant was issued, and Fraley was arrested.
- An examining trial (preliminary hearing) was held before the justice of the peace.
- Following the hearing, the justice of the peace committed Fraley to jail without bail to await trial for murder in the district court.
- Fraley filed an original application for a writ of habeas corpus directly with the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, seeking to be released on bail.
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Issue:
Is a defendant charged with murder entitled to bail on the grounds that the killing was committed in the heat of passion when the provocation occurred nine to ten months prior to the homicide?
Opinions:
Majority - Richardson, Judge
No. A defendant charged with murder is not entitled to bail when the proof of guilt is evident and the alleged provocation occurred an unreasonable amount of time prior to the homicide. The court reasoned that the nine to ten months that elapsed between the killing of the petitioner's son and the petitioner's killing of the deceased was, as a matter of law, sufficient cooling time for the passion of a reasonable person to subside. A deliberate killing committed in revenge for a past injury is murder. The court cited precedents holding that periods as short as fifteen minutes to a few hours were sufficient cooling time. Therefore, the petitioner's claim of acting in the heat of passion fails, the proof of his guilt of a capital offense is evident, and he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. The court also rejected the petitioner's request for discretionary bail based on health concerns, finding the physicians' statements to be conclusory opinions lacking the necessary factual basis for the court to evaluate.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the legal doctrine of "cooling time" in homicide law, clarifying that when an objectively unreasonable period has passed since a provocation, a court can find sufficient cooling time as a matter of law. This prevents a defendant from reducing a charge of murder to manslaughter by claiming a subjectively lingering passion over an extended period. The decision establishes that revenge killings motivated by past events, no matter how tragic, are legally considered murder due to the opportunity for premeditation afforded by time. It also sets a standard for evidentiary submissions in bail applications, requiring factual support for expert opinions rather than mere conclusions.
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