Evitts v. Lucey
469 U.S. 387 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel on their first appeal as of right.
Facts:
- Keith E. Lucey was convicted of trafficking in controlled substances by a Kentucky jury.
- Lucey retained counsel to represent him in his first appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
- Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure required the filing of a document called a 'statement of appeal' along with the brief and record.
- Lucey's counsel filed the appellate brief and the record on appeal in a timely manner.
- However, Lucey's counsel failed to file the required 'statement of appeal' document.
- This procedural failure was the sole basis for the state court's refusal to hear the merits of Lucey's appeal.
Procedural Posture:
- After being convicted by a jury in a Kentucky trial court, Lucey filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Commonwealth of Kentucky, the appellee, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on Lucey's counsel's failure to file a required 'statement of appeal.'
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
- Lucey's motion for reconsideration was summarily denied by the Court of Appeals.
- Lucey then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which affirmed the dismissal.
- Lucey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
- The District Court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, finding Lucey's right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated.
- The Commonwealth appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Sixth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal as of right. The Court's reasoning merges two established lines of precedent: 1) the right to counsel on a first appeal as of right to ensure the appeal is 'adequate and effective' (Douglas v. California), and 2) the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial (Strickland v. Washington). An appeal is a critical adversarial proceeding where a layperson cannot navigate the intricate rules; therefore, nominal representation is insufficient. The promise of a right to counsel on appeal would be a 'futile gesture' if it did not include the right to effective assistance. The Court rejected the state's argument that this holding would undermine procedural rules, suggesting that states can sanction the attorney rather than penalize the client, or provide other forms of post-conviction relief. The Court also clarified that while a state is not required to create an appellate system, once it does, it must operate that system in accordance with the Due Process Clause, which ensures fundamental fairness between the state and the individual.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
No. The Court's decision adds another barrier to the finality of criminal convictions without contributing to fairer justice. It contributes to the problem of interminable appeals that lowers public confidence in the courts.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Court creates a due process right to effective assistance on appeal 'virtually out of whole cloth.' The precedents relied upon by the majority, such as Douglas and Griffin, are rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause; their purpose is to ensure indigent defendants are not denied access to appeals because of their poverty, not to create a universal right to a perfect appeal. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel applies only to trial-level 'prosecutions' and 'defense,' not to appeals where the defendant is no longer presumed innocent. Because there is no underlying due process right to counsel on appeal, there can be no derivative right to the effective assistance of counsel under that clause. This decision will open the floodgates for habeas petitions and undermine the enforcement of appellate procedural rules.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the scope of the right to counsel by extending the guarantee of 'effective assistance' from the trial level to a criminal defendant's first appeal as of right. It solidifies the idea that once a state grants a right, such as the right to appeal, it must be a meaningful one, protected by the fundamental fairness requirements of the Due Process Clause. The decision clarifies that the line of cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois rests on both Due Process and Equal Protection grounds, giving constitutional footing to claims of unfair appellate procedures beyond just those involving indigency. This creates a new and important basis for post-conviction relief for defendants whose appeals were dismissed or denied due to their lawyer's professional errors.
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