Evans v. United States
504 U.S. 255 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The Hobbs Act's prohibition against extortion "under color of official right" does not require the government to prove an affirmative act of inducement, such as a demand, by the public official. A conviction is proper where a public official has accepted a payment to which they were not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.
Facts:
- Evans was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia.
- An undercover FBI agent, posing as a real estate developer, sought Evans's assistance in rezoning a 25-acre tract of land.
- The agent initiated virtually all of the conversations with Evans, seeking his favorable vote and his help in persuading fellow commissioners.
- On July 25, 1986, the agent gave Evans $7,000 in cash and a $1,000 check payable to his campaign.
- Evans accepted the cash payment with the understanding that it was intended to ensure he would vote in favor of the rezoning application.
- Evans did not report the $7,000 cash on his state campaign-financing disclosure form or his federal income tax return.
Procedural Posture:
- Evans was charged in a two-count indictment with extortion and tax fraud in a federal trial court.
- A jury found Evans guilty on both counts.
- Evans appealed the conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that passive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is sufficient for a Hobbs Act violation.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether an affirmative act of inducement is a required element of the offense.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for extortion "under color of official right" under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, require proof that the public official made an affirmative demand or inducement for the payment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. A conviction for extortion "under color of official right" does not require the government to prove that the public official initiated or induced the payment; passive acceptance is sufficient if the official knows the payment is a quid pro quo for an official act. The Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the Hobbs Act, adopted the common-law definition of extortion, which did not require a demand or request by the official. The common-law offense was committed when an official took money 'by colour of his office' that was not due to him. The statutory text of the Hobbs Act separates the inducement requirement, which applies to extortion by force or fear, from the 'under color of official right' prong. Even if the term 'induced' were to apply, the coercive element is inherently provided by the public office itself.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
Yes. The majority misinterprets the common-law meaning of extortion and improperly expands federal criminal jurisdiction. At common law, the element of 'under color of office' required that the official take money under a false pretense of official entitlement, making the payor an innocent victim. This is distinct from bribery, where both parties are culpable. The majority's holding blurs this distinction and essentially creates a federal bribery statute. Furthermore, the rule of lenity requires construing the statute so that the word 'induced' applies to both forms of extortion. The majority's last-minute addition of a 'quid pro quo' requirement is textually and historically baseless, borrowed from another case simply to limit its otherwise overbroad definition of the crime.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
I join the majority in answering the specific question of whether inducement is an element of the offense. However, I do not join the part of the majority opinion that addresses the dissent's argument that common-law extortion required a 'false pretense of official right.' This issue was not raised by the petitioner or briefed by the parties, and it would be imprudent for the Court to decide it without proper adversarial presentation.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes, inducement is a required element, but its meaning is fulfilled by the existence of a quid pro quo. The rule of lenity suggests the word 'induced' applies to official extortion, but it does not require that the official initiate the transaction. Instead, the inducement comes from the official's corrupt use of their office to generate a quid pro quo. This requirement is essential to the offense and prevents the statute from being unconstitutionally vague. Because the jury instructions satisfied the quid pro quo requirement, the conviction should be affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision resolved a circuit split and significantly broadened the reach of the Hobbs Act in public corruption cases. By holding that passive acceptance of a bribe can constitute extortion, the Court made it easier for federal prosecutors to convict state and local officials without having to prove a specific demand or threat. This effectively aligns the 'under color of official right' prong of extortion with the crime of bribery, focusing the inquiry on the existence of a quid pro quo. The dissent's strong objections highlight the decision's significant impact on federalism by expanding the federal government's role in policing local political integrity.
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