Evans v. Olinde
609 So. 2d 299, 1992 WL 320082 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A following motorist is presumed negligent for a rear-end collision, but this presumption can be rebutted under the sudden emergency doctrine if the motorist proves the lead vehicle created an unanticipated hazard, such as being unlit on a highway at night, which could not be reasonably avoided.
Facts:
- On the evening of October 21, 1983, Steven Otterstatter was driving on Interstate 10 with his two daughters.
- Elizabeth Olinde was driving in the same direction, traveling behind Otterstatter's vehicle.
- Olinde's vehicle collided with the rear of Otterstatter's vehicle.
- Otterstatter alleged that his vehicle's lights were on and he was driving normally when Olinde struck him.
- Olinde alleged that Otterstatter's vehicle was unlit and appeared suddenly in her path, as if it had already struck a guardrail which disabled its lights.
- The collision caused Otterstatter's car to flip over, and his two daughters were ejected from the vehicle and seriously injured.
Procedural Posture:
- Robin Evans, on behalf of her minor children, filed suit in a Louisiana trial court against Elizabeth Olinde, Steven Otterstatter, and their respective insurance companies.
- The claims for the children's injuries were settled.
- Steven Otterstatter filed a cross-claim against Olinde and her insurer, Continental Insurance Co., for his own emotional and psychological damages.
- A jury trial was held on Otterstatter's cross-claim.
- The jury returned a verdict finding that Elizabeth Olinde was free from fault for the accident.
- Otterstatter, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a following motorist overcome the legal presumption of negligence for a rear-end collision by presenting credible evidence that the lead vehicle was an unlit, slow-moving hazard on the highway at night, thereby creating a sudden emergency?
Opinions:
Majority - Stoker, J.
Yes. A following motorist overcomes the presumption of negligence by establishing that the lead vehicle presented an unanticipated hazard constituting a sudden emergency. The court held that the jury's finding that Olinde was free from fault was not manifestly erroneous. It affirmed that a following motorist is generally presumed negligent in a rear-end collision but can rebut this presumption by proving a sudden emergency. Here, the jury found Olinde's testimony, supported by an expert, to be more credible; specifically, that Otterstatter’s vehicle was unlit and moving slowly on the highway at night. The court recognized an unlit vehicle under such conditions as an unusual and unanticipated hazard that a reasonably prudent driver would not expect. Because Olinde was not driving at an excessive speed or otherwise contributing to the hazard, the sudden emergency doctrine applied, absolving her of fault for the collision.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the application of the sudden emergency doctrine as a powerful defense to the strong presumption of negligence in rear-end collision cases. The decision highlights that the presumption against the following driver is rebuttable, not absolute. It underscores the critical importance of factual determinations and credibility assessments by the trier of fact (the jury, in this instance), especially when faced with conflicting testimony and expert evidence. This precedent solidifies that an unlit vehicle on a dark highway is a quintessential example of an unanticipated hazard that can trigger the sudden emergency doctrine and exonerate a following driver who was otherwise exercising due care.
