Evans v. Jeff D.
475 U.S. 717 (1986)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) does not prohibit a district court from approving a settlement in a civil rights class action that conditions substantial relief on the merits upon a waiver of the plaintiff's statutory eligibility for attorney's fees.
Facts:
- A class of children with emotional and mental handicaps (respondents), represented by Idaho Legal Aid Society lawyer Charles Johnson, alleged that the care provided by Idaho state officials (petitioners) was deficient.
- The Idaho Legal Aid Society was a non-profit organization prohibited from representing clients who could pay their own fees and had no fee agreement with the class members.
- The parties first settled the educational services claims with a stipulation that each party would bear its own attorney's fees and costs.
- One week before trial on the remaining health care claims, Idaho officials offered a settlement that provided the class with virtually all the injunctive relief sought.
- This comprehensive settlement offer was expressly conditioned on the class waiving any claim to attorney's fees and costs.
- Johnson determined that his ethical obligation to his clients required him to accept the highly favorable settlement offer, so he agreed to the fee waiver, conditioning the entire agreement on the district court's approval.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondents (Jeff D. et al.) filed a class action lawsuit against petitioners (Evans et al.) in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, seeking injunctive relief and attorney's fees.
- The parties submitted a proposed consent decree that granted respondents substantial injunctive relief but included a waiver of all claims for attorney's fees and costs.
- Respondents' counsel moved the District Court to approve the settlement on the merits but to reject the fee waiver provision and allow respondents to petition for fees.
- The District Court approved the settlement in its entirety, including the fee waiver, and denied the motion to submit a fee petition.
- Respondents appealed the denial of attorney's fees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals invalidated the fee waiver provision but left the remainder of the settlement intact, remanding the case for a determination of reasonable fees.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 prohibit a court from approving a class action settlement that is conditioned on the plaintiff class waiving its statutory eligibility for attorney's fees?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not prohibit a court from approving a settlement conditioned upon a waiver of statutory attorney's fees. The Act bestows fee eligibility on the 'prevailing party,' not the party's attorney, and does not render this eligibility non-negotiable or nonwaivable. A general proscription against fee waivers would impede the vindication of civil rights by reducing the attractiveness of settlement, as defendants are often unwilling to settle without knowing their total liability, including fees. Prohibiting fee negotiations would force more cases to trial, burdening the courts and disserving civil rights litigants. A district court, under its Rule 23(e) authority, has the discretion to approve a settlement containing a fee waiver, so long as the settlement is reasonable and fair to the class. In this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the extensive injunctive relief obtained by the class was an adequate 'quid pro quo' for the fee waiver.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 should be interpreted to prohibit settlements conditioned on fee waivers. The majority misunderstands the primary purpose of the Fees Act, which was not merely to provide another remedy, but to ensure that civil rights plaintiffs could find competent counsel by creating economic incentives for lawyers to take their cases. Allowing defendants to demand fee waivers systematically undermines this congressional purpose. Defendants will routinely seek waivers, and plaintiffs, who have no personal stake in the fees, will readily agree in order to obtain relief on the merits. This practice creates an ethical dilemma for attorneys and will, in the aggregate, diminish lawyers' expectations of being paid, thereby reducing the availability of counsel for future civil rights victims and frustrating the 'private attorneys general' enforcement scheme Congress intended to create.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that attorney's fees under § 1988 are a negotiable element of settlement, rather than a non-waivable right of the attorney or the public. The ruling gives defendants significant leverage by allowing them to make lump-sum offers or condition favorable merits relief on a fee waiver, thereby capping their total potential liability. This creates a potential ethical conflict for civil rights attorneys, who may have to recommend a settlement beneficial to their client but detrimental to their own (or their organization's) financial interest. While the Court allows for judicial discretion to reject settlements where a fee waiver is part of a vindictive policy to deter civil rights litigation, it ultimately favors settlement and treats fee waivers as a legitimate bargaining chip.
Unlock the full brief for Evans v. Jeff D.