Janet Evans v. Mosleh Aydha d/b/a JB’s Convenience Store
Not available in provided text (2016)
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Rule of Law:
In a premises liability case, circumstantial evidence regarding the appearance of a hazardous condition, such as testimony that a substance was dirty and appeared old, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the business owner's constructive knowledge, thereby precluding summary judgment.
Facts:
- Janet Evans was at JB’s Convenience Store in Pontotoc to pump gasoline.
- While waiting for the attendant to activate the pump, Evans slipped and fell, striking her head on the concrete pavement.
- After she fell, Evans observed a black spot on the pavement where she slipped, but could not identify the substance.
- Evans's daughter arrived at the scene shortly thereafter, while Evans's car was still parked at the pump.
- The daughter observed a spot of "black oily residue or sludge" near the pump where her mother had fallen.
- The daughter described the spot as dirty and stated that it was obvious to her that the residue had been on the pavement for an extended period, at least several days.
Procedural Posture:
- Janet Evans sued Mosleh Aydha, d/b/a JB's Convenience Store, in the Circuit Court of Pontotoc County (trial court) for premises liability.
- The defendant, JB's, filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissing Evans's case.
- Janet Evans, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff in a premises liability action produce sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment on the element of constructive knowledge by presenting a witness affidavit describing a hazardous substance as dirty, oily, and appearing to have been on the ground for several days?
Opinions:
Majority - Fair, J.
Yes. A plaintiff produces sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment by presenting such an affidavit. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, testimony describing a hazardous substance as dirty, sludge-like, and appearing to have been present for an extended period is enough to take the claim out of the realm of mere conjecture and create a reasonable inference of constructive knowledge. This court has previously held that descriptions of a spill as 'dirty, with shoe prints and cart tracks in it' or a banana peel as 'black in color' and 'soiled up' were sufficient for a jury to infer the hazard existed long enough to put the owner on notice. The daughter's detailed affidavit provides a similar basis for a reasonable inference that the oily spot existed long enough that JB's, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about it.
Dissenting - Griffis, P.J.
No. The plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding constructive knowledge. The plaintiff herself could not identify the substance or its condition, and her daughter did not witness the fall. The daughter's affidavit, which attests that the spot looked several days old, is merely an opinion and not the specific proof required to establish the length of time the hazard existed. A court should not indulge presumptions to cure deficiencies in a plaintiff's evidence; proof merely of the occurrence of a fall on a floor with debris is insufficient to show negligence. The plaintiff failed to produce admissible evidence as to the relevant length of time the hazard existed, and therefore summary judgment was appropriate.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the evidentiary standard for constructive knowledge in premises liability cases at the summary judgment stage. It establishes that a plaintiff can defeat a summary judgment motion with purely circumstantial evidence based on the appearance of the hazard, without needing direct evidence of how long the substance was present. The ruling emphasizes that determinations of credibility and the weight of conflicting testimony are functions for the jury, not a judge on a summary judgment motion. This precedent makes it more difficult for business owners to dispose of 'slip and fall' cases before trial when there is any evidence suggesting a hazard was not recent.
