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Evans v. Abney

Supreme Court of the United States
24 L. Ed. 2d 634, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 3133, 396 U.S. 435 (1970)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The application of neutral state trust law by a court to terminate a charitable trust and revert the property to the testator's heirs, when the trust's racially discriminatory purpose becomes constitutionally unenforceable, does not constitute state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


Facts:

  • In 1911, United States Senator A. O. Bacon executed a will devising a tract of land in trust to the City of Macon, Georgia.
  • The will specified that the land was to be used as a 'park and pleasure ground' for 'the sole, perpetual and unending, use, benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls, white boys and white children of the City of Macon.'
  • Senator Bacon's will stated that he was not motivated by unkindness but was of the opinion that 'in their social relations the two races . . . should be forever separate.'
  • The will further stipulated that the property was 'under no circumstances ... to be ... at any time for any reason devoted to any other purpose or use.'
  • The City of Macon accepted the trust and for many years operated the park, named Baconsfield, on a segregated basis.
  • In time, the City of Macon began allowing African Americans to use the park, concluding it was a public facility that could not be constitutionally maintained on a segregated basis.

Procedural Posture:

  • Individual members of the park's Board of Managers sued the City of Macon in a Georgia state trial court to remove the city as trustee.
  • Negro citizens of Macon (Petitioners) intervened, seeking to prevent the appointment of private trustees.
  • The City of Macon resigned as trustee, and the trial court appointed new private trustees.
  • The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision.
  • On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Evans v. Newton, reversed, holding the park was a public facility that could not be operated on a racially discriminatory basis.
  • On remand, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that the trust's purpose had become impossible and sent the case back to the trial court.
  • The successor trustees of Senator Bacon's estate moved the trial court to declare that the trust had failed and the property reverted to the Senator's heirs.
  • The trial court denied the application of the cy pres doctrine, ruled that the trust failed, and held that the property reverted to the heirs.
  • The Negro intervenors appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which affirmed the trial court's decision.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Issue:

Does a state court's application of neutral trust law principles, which results in a racially restrictive charitable trust reverting to the testator's heirs because its discriminatory purpose is constitutionally impossible to fulfill, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?


Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Black

No. A state court's application of neutral trust law principles, which results in a racially restrictive charitable trust reverting to the testator's heirs because its discriminatory purpose is constitutionally impossible to fulfill, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Georgia courts correctly determined that Senator Bacon's primary and inseparable charitable intent was to create a segregated park for white people. When this Court's decision in Evans v. Newton made segregated operation impossible, the trust's sole purpose failed. Under Georgia's cy pres doctrine, a trust can only be modified if the testator had a general charitable intent; since Bacon's intent was specific and not general, cy pres could not be applied. Consequently, under neutral and long-standing Georgia trust law, the trust failed and the property reverted to Bacon's heirs. This state court action is distinguishable from Shelley v. Kraemer because it did not enforce private discrimination; rather, it eliminated the park entirely, a loss shared equally by all races. The discriminatory motivation originated with the private testator, Senator Bacon, not with the state court, which merely applied its normal principles of will construction.


Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas

Yes. The termination of the trust violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Giving the property to the heirs does as much violence to Senator Bacon's purpose—which included dedicating the land for a municipal use and forbidding its sale—as integrating the park would. Continuing the property's use as an integrated municipal park carries out a larger share of Bacon's purpose than the complete destruction of that use. Furthermore, returning the property to private hands will not ensure the racial segregation Bacon desired, as any future commercial use of the city real estate would be subject to anti-discrimination laws. The Georgia court's decision is merely a 'gesture toward a state-sanctioned segregated way of life' and acts as an unconstitutional penalty for obedience to the Constitution.


Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan

Yes. The closing of the park is unconstitutional state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Baconsfield was a public facility, maintained for nearly 50 years with public and federal funds. Closing a public facility for the sole and explicit reason of avoiding the constitutional duty to desegregate is unconstitutional, as established in cases like Griffin v. County School Board. The state action here is overwhelming: 1) Georgia statutes at the time specifically authorized and encouraged such discriminatory trusts, implicating the state under Reitman v. Mulkey; 2) the state court's enforcement of the reverter gives effect to a private discriminatory scheme, which is forbidden by Shelley v. Kraemer; and 3) the City of Macon, a state actor, abdicated its constitutional duty by resigning as trustee to allow the reversion to occur. The state is not a neutral party but is 'significantly involved' in the discrimination.



Analysis:

This decision significantly refines the 'state action' doctrine, creating a distinction between a court unconstitutionally enforcing private discrimination (as in Shelley v. Kraemer) and constitutionally applying neutral principles of property and trust law, even if those principles effectuate a private testator's discriminatory intent. The Court prioritized the testator's freedom to dispose of property over the public's interest in maintaining a charitable gift, establishing that the Equal Protection Clause does not compel a state to reform a private charitable trust by ignoring the testator's explicit, albeit discriminatory, intent. The ruling demonstrates that the consequence of desegregation mandates can sometimes be the loss of the facility itself, for all citizens, if the facility's creation was inseparably tied to a discriminatory purpose.

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