Eugene J. Lussan v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company
280 F.2d 491, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4238 (1960)
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Rule of Law:
An instinctive, reflexive action taken in response to a sudden emergency or perceived threat, such as swatting at a wasp while driving, may be considered the conduct of an ordinary prudent person and therefore not negligent. The determination of whether such an action meets the standard of due care is a question of fact for the jury.
Facts:
- The defendant was driving his automobile in New Orleans with two passengers in the front seat.
- A wasp flew into the car, or its presence was suddenly discovered.
- The defendant driver swatted at the wasp, believing the threat was neutralized.
- Shortly after, a passenger shouted, "watch out, it’s still alive," indicating the wasp was on the floorboard.
- Instinctively, the defendant driver looked down at the floorboard and made a second sweeping swat at the wasp.
- This reflexive action caused the driver to lurch, pull the steering wheel, and crash the vehicle into a car parked at the curb.
- One of the passengers, the plaintiff, sustained substantial injuries as a result of the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, an injured passenger, sued the defendant driver's direct-action insurer in federal district court (the court of first instance).
- The plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict was presumably denied by the trial court judge.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant.
- The plaintiff then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), which was denied by the trial court.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the denial of these motions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a driver's reflexive action of swatting at a wasp inside a moving vehicle constitute negligence as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge John R. Brown
No, a driver's reflexive action of swatting at a wasp does not constitute negligence as a matter of law; a jury is entitled to find that such an action was that of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. The standard for overturning a jury verdict is that no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion. The court reasoned that the driver's response was an involuntary, instinctive reaction to an apprehended harm, rooted in self-preservation. The legal standard of care is not what could have been done to avoid all damage, but what a 'prudent human being' would have done in the same situation. Judging whether an instinctive, common human response is prudent is the quintessential role of the jury, which draws upon the community's collective experience. Since the jury, under proper instructions, found the driver's conduct to be normal and prudent, the court will not substitute its own judgment.
Analysis:
This case strongly affirms the role of the jury as the primary fact-finder in negligence cases, particularly those involving the 'sudden emergency' doctrine. It establishes that an instinctive or reflexive action is not negligent per se, but instead must be evaluated by a jury against the standard of a reasonably prudent person facing similar circumstances. The decision makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain a directed verdict or JNOV in cases where a defendant's conduct, while causing harm, is a common and understandable human reaction to a sudden threat. It reinforces the high bar for taking a question of negligence away from the jury.
