Ettinger v. Ettinger
637 P.2d 63, 1981 OK 130, 1981 Okla. LEXIS 297 (1981)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A divorce court's jurisdiction to divide property is statutorily limited to property acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage. Any provision in a divorce decree that purports to divide property that may be acquired in the future is beyond the court's jurisdiction and is therefore void.
Facts:
- A husband and wife were married, during which time the husband was employed by OKC Corporation.
- The wife filed for divorce from the husband.
- As part of the dissolution, the husband executed a divorce decree that had been prepared.
- The decree contained a provision awarding the wife "one-half of any and all stock options that defendant (Appellee) shall have with OKC Corporation... even though said stock options shall or may accrue in the future."
- Several years after the divorce became final, the husband acquired new stock options through his employment with OKC Corporation.
- The husband refused to transfer one-half of these post-divorce stock options to his former wife.
Procedural Posture:
- On January 6, 1972, Appellant (wife) filed a divorce suit against Appellee (husband) in an Oklahoma trial court.
- On March 23, 1972, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce.
- On March 5, 1979, the wife filed an application for contempt citation in the same trial court, alleging the husband had violated the decree.
- The husband filed a response and an application to vacate in part the 1972 divorce decree, arguing the provision dividing future property was void.
- The trial court granted the husband's application to vacate, finding it was without jurisdiction to divide future property and declaring that portion of the decree null and void.
- The wife (Appellant) appealed the trial court's order vacating part of the decree to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a trial court have the jurisdictional authority in a divorce decree to divide property, such as stock options, that a spouse may acquire in the future after the dissolution of the marriage?
Opinions:
Majority - Barnes, Vice Chief Justice
No. A trial court does not have the jurisdictional authority to divide property that a spouse may acquire after the marriage has ended. The court's authority, derived from statute 12 O.S. § 1278, is strictly limited to dividing property that was 'acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage.' Stock options that did not exist at the time of the divorce are not jointly acquired property from the coverture period. Because the court exceeded its statutory power, or jurisdiction, in attempting to divide future assets, that portion of the judgment is void, not merely erroneous. The decree was not a valid consent decree that could circumvent this statutory limitation, as there was no separate property settlement agreement evidencing a clear intent by the parties to do so. A void judgment can be vacated at any time.
Dissenting - Simms, Justice
No, but the decree should not have been vacated. The provision awarding future stock options was, at most, a legal error, not a jurisdictional defect that would render the judgment void. The decree became a final judgment when the husband failed to file a timely appeal after it was entered. By not appealing, he forfeited his right to challenge the error years later. The original court had jurisdiction to render a divorce decree, and any error within that decree should have been addressed through the normal appellate process, not through a collateral attack seven years after the fact.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the critical distinction between a void judgment and a merely erroneous one in the context of divorce decrees. By defining the division of future property as an act beyond the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, the court makes such provisions void ab initio and subject to collateral attack at any time. This contrasts with erroneous judgments, which are valid until reversed and must be challenged through timely appeals. The ruling strictly construes the statutory limits on a court's power in property division, affirming that parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent where it is statutorily lacking.
