Estate of Woodworth
unknown (1993)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Absent clear evidence of a testator's contrary intent, the identity of 'heirs' entitled to a remainder interest in a trust is determined at the date of death of the named ancestor, even if that ancestor predeceases the life tenant.
Facts:
- Harold Evans Woodworth's will created a testamentary trust, with his wife, Mamie Barlow Woodworth, as the life tenant.
- The trust provided that upon Mamie's death, the remaining assets would be distributed to Harold's sister, Elizabeth Plass, if she was then surviving.
- If Elizabeth Plass was not surviving upon Mamie's death, the trust assets were to be distributed to Elizabeth's 'heirs at law.'
- Elizabeth Plass died in 1980, predeceasing the life tenant, Mamie. At the time of her death, Elizabeth's heirs at law included her husband, Raymond Plass, and two other relatives (the Woodworth heirs).
- Raymond Plass died in 1988, leaving the residue of his estate to the Regents of the University of California.
- Mamie Barlow Woodworth, the life tenant, died in 1991.
Procedural Posture:
- After the life tenant's death, Wells Fargo Bank, the successor trustee, petitioned the probate court to determine the proper beneficiaries of the trust remainder.
- The probate court concluded that Elizabeth Plass’s heirs should be determined as of the date of the life tenant’s (Mamie Woodworth’s) death.
- Based on its conclusion, the probate court ordered the trustee to distribute the entire trust estate to the Woodworth heirs.
- The Regents of the University of California, as the residuary legatee of Raymond Plass's estate, appealed the probate court's order to the Court of Appeal.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the common law rule of early vesting require that the 'heirs at law' of a remainder beneficiary who predeceases a life tenant be determined at the time of the remainder beneficiary's death, rather than at the time of the life tenant's death, when the testamentary instrument lacks a clear expression of contrary intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Dibiaso, Acting P. J.
Yes. The common law preference for early vesting dictates that unless a testator expresses a contrary intent, the identity of 'heirs' entitled to a remainder interest must be determined as of the date of death of the named ancestor who predeceased the life tenant. The court reasoned that the normal rule of construction is to identify heirs at the time of the ancestor's death, as this reflects the technical meaning of the term and promotes uniformity and predictability in the law. The court distinguished this case from those applying an exception for contingent, substitutional gifts, noting that the exception is narrow and typically applies only where the testator's own heirs are the beneficiaries and applying the early vesting rule would create an 'incongruous result' (e.g., giving property back to a life tenant who was supposed to lose it on a contingency). Here, there was no such incongruity, nor did the trust instrument contain specific language of futurity, like 'then living heirs' or 'shall vest,' that would justify departing from the default rule of early vesting.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strong common law preference for the early vesting of property interests and clarifies the limited scope of exceptions to this rule. It emphasizes that for a court to delay the determination of heirs until a life tenant's death, the testator's intent must be explicitly stated in the instrument. By rejecting a speculative inquiry into what the testator might have wanted based on later events, the court prioritizes legal certainty and predictability in the interpretation of wills and trusts. This case serves as a strong reminder to estate planners that ambiguity will be resolved in favor of early vesting, and specific drafting is required to achieve a different outcome.
