Estate of Starks v. Enyart
1993 WL 347169, 5 F. 3d 230 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity for the use of deadly force if the officer's own unreasonable conduct created the imminent threat of serious bodily harm that ostensibly justified the use of that force. Other officers present are also not entitled to immunity if the suspect's threatening action was an involuntary consequence of the first officer's unreasonable conduct.
Facts:
- On November 1, 1989, Damon Starks stole a taxicab and drove it to a Taco Bell parking lot.
- Three uniformed officers, Sergeant Enyart, Officer Black, and Officer Shaffer, arrived in marked police cars and surrounded the stolen cab.
- Sgt. Enyart ordered Starks to exit the vehicle and opened the driver's door, but Starks slammed it shut and locked all the doors.
- Starks put the cab in reverse, slowly backing into a police car, and then drove forward, but a utility pole blocked his path.
- Starks reversed again to create a better angle to drive past the pole.
- According to the plaintiffs' version of events, as Starks accelerated forward a second time to escape, Officer Black, who had been standing behind the utility pole, jumped into the direct path of the moving cab.
- All three officers then fired their weapons, killing Starks.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs sued Officers Black, Enyart, and Shaffer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court, alleging a violation of Damon Starks' civil rights.
- The defendant officers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity.
- The district court (trial court) denied the officers' motion for summary judgment.
- The defendant officers filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Do police officers retain qualified immunity for using deadly force against a fleeing suspect when one officer's own allegedly unreasonable action—stepping into the direct path of the suspect's rapidly accelerating vehicle—created the immediate threat that justified the use of force?
Opinions:
Majority - Flaum, Circuit Judge.
No, police officers do not retain qualified immunity under these circumstances. An officer who unreasonably creates a physically threatening situation during a Fourth Amendment seizure cannot be immunized for the subsequent use of deadly force. The court reasoned that under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, deadly force is only permissible against a fleeing felon who presents an immediate danger to the officer or others. Here, the underlying crime was non-violent car theft. The imminent danger only arose when Officer Black was in the path of the accelerating cab. Accepting the plaintiffs' facts, Black unreasonably created this danger by jumping in front of a fast-moving car, leaving Starks no time to stop. Because Black's own unreasonable action provoked the threat, he cannot be granted qualified immunity. Similarly, the other two officers are not entitled to immunity. If Starks had no time to brake, his action of driving towards Black was involuntary. Citing Brower v. County of Inyo, the court analogized that a threat must be willful to warrant deadly force; an 'involuntary' threat created solely by police unreasonableness does not justify such an intrusion.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the qualified immunity defense in excessive force cases by focusing on the officer's role in creating the danger. It establishes the principle that the 'reasonableness' inquiry under the Fourth Amendment includes an evaluation of whether an officer's own actions unnecessarily escalated a situation to a point where deadly force became 'necessary.' The case prevents officers from manufacturing a justification for deadly force by placing themselves in harm's way. This adds a crucial layer to the analysis, requiring courts to look at the entire sequence of events, not just the final moment of confrontation, and introduces the concept that a suspect's 'threat' must be voluntary to justify a deadly response.
