Estate of Davis
920 S.W. 2d 463, 1996 WL 154120 (1996)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To set aside a will based on undue influence, the contestant must prove not only the opportunity and motive for influence but also that the influence was actually exerted in the making of the will, that it subverted the testator's mind at the time of execution, and that the will would not have been executed but for that influence.
Facts:
- Ruby and Edgar Davis, parents of six children (David, Eddie, Donna, Bobby, Annessia, Tina), executed wills on April 12, 1990, devising their estate equally to their children if the spouse predeceased.
- Edgar Davis became ill in June 1990, suffered declining health, and was hospitalized in May 1991 for cancer of the larynx, remaining there for 44 days before dying on June 30, 1991.
- During Edgar's final illness, family conflicts arose: Ruby decided against a surgical procedure for Edgar, leading Eddie and David to hire an attorney to challenge her decision; Eddie argued with Annessia and Tina over home care; and Annessia, Tina, and Donna obtained peace bonds against Eddie, effectively barring him from Ruby's house when they were present.
- After Edgar's death, further conflicts occurred regarding funeral arrangements, and Eddie and David took two guns from the parents' home without Ruby’s knowledge.
- Following Edgar's funeral, Eddie and David had no further contact with Ruby, nor did Ruby attempt to reconcile with them, while Annessia and Tina lived with Ruby for some time and frequently discussed the "hurtful actions" of Eddie and David.
- In October 1991, Ruby visited an attorney multiple times, discussing her family conflicts and instructing him to change her will to remove Eddie as executor, leave Eddie and David only $1,000 each, and divide the remainder among Bobby, Donna, Annessia, and Tina; she then executed this new will.
Procedural Posture:
- Ruby Davis died in March 1994.
- Bobby, Annessia, Tina Davis, and Donna Thompson (appellants) sought to have Ruby Davis's October 1991 will admitted to probate in the trial court.
- Eddie and David Davis (contestants) contested the will, alleging undue influence.
- A jury in the trial court found that undue influence was exerted by Donna, Annessia, and Tina.
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the contestants, setting aside Ruby Davis's October 1991 will and admitting her previous April 1990 will to probate.
- Bobby, Annessia, Tina Davis, and Donna Thompson (appellants) perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals, contending the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of undue influence.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does legally or factually sufficient evidence exist to prove that Ruby Davis's last will was procured through undue influence exerted by Donna, Annessia, and Tina, so as to justify setting aside the will?
Opinions:
Majority - Dodson, Justice
No, the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that Ruby Davis's last will was procured through undue influence by her daughters, Donna, Annessia, and Tina. The court applied the three-part test for undue influence from Rothermel v. Duncan, requiring proof of the existence and exertion of influence, the effective operation of that influence to subvert the testator's mind, and that the will would not have been executed but for such influence. Regarding the first element (exertion of influence), while the daughters had opportunity and potential motive (living with Ruby, discussing her other sons' actions, needing money), there was no concrete proof that this influence was actually exerted with respect to the making of the will itself. The court stated that mere requests or entreaties are not enough unless they are so excessive as to subvert the testator's will. The only testimony regarding the will's execution came from Ruby's attorney and his secretary, who stated Ruby was alone during her three visits to change her will and that she wrote a letter explaining her motivations. Concerning the second element (subversion of mind), even assuming some influence was exerted, there was no evidence that Ruby's mind was overpowered. Although she was emotionally and physically drained after her husband's death, her attorney believed she was making the changes to her will of her own free will. Finally, for the third element (but-for causation), the court found a reasonable explanation for the unequal distribution of property: Ruby was deeply hurt by Eddie and David's actions and was described as a strong-willed woman. Therefore, the unequal division was not an "unnatural disposition" suggesting undue influence. The record lacked evidence that the daughters' conversations caused Ruby to change her will due to undue influence, rather than her own independent decision based on her feelings. The court concluded that circumstances equally consistent with the absence of undue influence, or that merely raise a suspicion, are insufficient. Due to procedural grounds (appellants not moving for an instructed verdict), the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial rather than rendering a final judgment.
Analysis:
This case establishes a high bar for proving undue influence in Texas, emphasizing that mere opportunity, motive, or general familial persuasion are insufficient without concrete evidence that the testator's free will was subverted at the time of execution. It clarifies that a will's unequal disposition is not inherently 'unnatural' if a reasonable explanation exists, such as the testator's genuine feelings or experiences, thereby protecting a testator's right to dispose of property as they wish, even if influenced by personal relationships and grievances, so long as their independent agency is maintained. Future cases challenging wills will need to present compelling evidence of direct exertion of influence and subversion of the testator's mental faculties, moving beyond circumstantial suggestions.
