Estate of Cilley v. Lane
2009 ME 133, 2009 Me. LEXIS 135, 985 A.2d 481 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the common law, a person does not have an affirmative duty to seek aid for another person in peril unless the person created the danger or a special relationship exists between the parties that gives rise to such a duty.
Facts:
- Jennifer Lane and Joshua Cilley had recently ended a romantic relationship.
- On January 31, 2005, Cilley arrived uninvited at Lane's trailer home shortly after she returned from a friend's house.
- Lane told Cilley to leave her home, but he refused and initially blocked her from exiting.
- During the encounter, Cilley obtained a rifle; it is disputed whether he brought it with him or it was already in the trailer.
- As Lane walked out of her trailer, she heard a 'pop', looked back, saw Cilley fall, and heard him say 'it was an accident.'
- Lane, believing Cilley had pretended to shoot himself, did not investigate his condition or call for help, and instead returned to her friend's trailer.
- Lane's friends went to investigate, found Cilley injured and struggling to breathe, and one of them called 911.
- Cilley later died from a single gunshot wound; a treating physician stated he could have been resuscitated had he arrived at the hospital 5-10 minutes earlier.
Procedural Posture:
- The Estate of Joshua S. Cilley filed a complaint against Jennifer Lane in the Superior Court (trial court) alleging counts including negligence and negligent failure to assist.
- Lane filed a counterclaim against the Estate.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to the Estate on one of Lane's counterclaims, and the other was dismissed by stipulation.
- The Estate dismissed its counts for battery and negligence.
- Lane moved for summary judgment on the Estate's remaining counts of negligent failure to assist and conscious pain and suffering.
- The Superior Court granted Lane's motion for summary judgment, finding she owed no duty of care to Cilley.
- The Estate of Joshua S. Cilley (appellant) filed a timely appeal of the summary judgment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a property owner have an affirmative duty to seek emergency assistance for a trespasser who sustains a self-inflicted injury on the owner's property?
Opinions:
Majority - Gorman, J.
No. A property owner does not owe an affirmative duty to seek emergency assistance for an injured trespasser when the owner did not create the danger and no special relationship exists. The court first determined that because Lane asked Cilley to leave and he refused, he was a trespasser. The only duty a landowner owes to a trespasser is to refrain from wanton, willful, or reckless behavior. Lane's failure to act did not meet this standard because she did not create the danger that injured Cilley. The court declined the Estate's request to establish a new common law duty for a witness to summon aid for an injured person, reasoning that this would contradict the established 'no duty to rescue' rule. Such a duty is only imposed where a special relationship exists (e.g., parent-child, employer-employee) or where the defendant's conduct created the peril. Creating a broad duty based merely on witnessing an injury would impose boundless liability for nonfeasance, and such a change to the law is a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces Maine's strict adherence to the traditional common law 'no duty to rescue' doctrine, which sharply distinguishes moral responsibility from legal obligation. The court clarifies that merely witnessing an injury, even on one's own property, does not create the 'special relationship' necessary to trigger an affirmative duty to act. By deferring to the legislature on the creation of any new duty to assist, the opinion solidifies the principle that courts are hesitant to expand liability for nonfeasance due to concerns about creating limitless legal obligations. The case serves as a crucial precedent distinguishing landowner liability towards trespassers from that owed to invited guests, and it underscores that without a legislatively-enacted 'duty to assist' statute, inaction in an emergency generally carries no civil liability.
