Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14649, 2014 WL 3746844, 761 F.3d 1099 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a substantive due process claim under the danger-creation exception unless their specific affirmative conduct was previously found to be unconstitutional by a court in a factually similar case, such that the law was 'clearly established' at the time of the alleged violation.
Facts:
- After their mother's death, Brooklyn 'Brook' Coons and her brother went to live with their father, Randy Coons, and his girlfriend, Melissa Wells.
- Beginning in September 2007, Brook's maternal grandparents, the Crosettos, observed numerous injuries on her, including extensive bruising, a black eye, and a stitched lip.
- A babysitter, a school employee, a pediatrician, and a police officer all made separate reports of suspected abuse to the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services (SRS).
- Linda Gillen, an SRS social worker with a history of animus toward the Crosettos, was assigned to the case.
- Gillen failed to return numerous calls from the grandparents and police, refused to accept a CD with photographic evidence of Brook's injuries, and told the grandparents that investigating abuse was a police matter.
- During one phone call, Gillen falsely told Mr. Crosetto that she had been inside the home to investigate, when she had not.
- On January 17, 2008, Melissa Wells assaulted Brook, causing a brain bleed and brain damage from Shaken Baby Syndrome.
- Brook died from her injuries three days later, and Melissa Wells was subsequently convicted of her murder.
Procedural Posture:
- Brook Coons' estate and her grandparents filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against social worker Linda Gillen in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas.
- Gillen moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court granted.
- The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- The Tenth Circuit, in an earlier decision (Estate of B.I.C. I), affirmed in part but reversed the summary judgment on the danger-creation claim, finding a genuine issue of fact as to whether Gillen's conduct 'shocked the conscience', and remanded the case.
- On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to Gillen, ruling that she committed no affirmative acts that increased the danger to Brook and that the law was not clearly established.
- The estate (appellant) appealed this second grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, with Gillen as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a social worker's conduct—including failures to investigate, misrepresenting that an investigation occurred, and refusing to accept evidence of abuse—violate a child's 'clearly established' substantive due process right under the danger-creation exception, thereby overcoming the social worker's qualified immunity?
Opinions:
Majority - Hartz, J.
No. The social worker's conduct did not violate a 'clearly established' constitutional right, and she is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Due Process Clause generally does not impose a duty on the state to protect individuals from private violence, as established in DeShaney v. Winnebago County. While a 'danger-creation' exception exists, a plaintiff must show the state official's affirmative acts increased the victim's vulnerability to harm and that the law clearly established such conduct was unconstitutional. Here, most of Gillen's alleged actions—refusing the CD, not returning calls, failing to substantiate abuse—were failures to act, not affirmative conduct that created danger. Her statements telling the Crosettos to contact the police did not cut off aid, distinguishing this case from precedent like Currier where an official told a parent to stop reporting abuse. Finally, Gillen's misrepresentation that she had visited the home did not violate a clearly established right because no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent at the time held that such false assurances constituted an affirmative act sufficient to invoke the danger-creation theory.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the high threshold for overcoming qualified immunity in danger-creation cases. By narrowly construing what constitutes an 'affirmative act' and demanding a nearly identical factual precedent to meet the 'clearly established' standard, the court makes it more difficult to hold state actors accountable for malfeasance that is not simple inaction but also not a direct physical act. The ruling highlights that even egregious professional failures and deliberate misrepresentations by a social worker may not be sufficient to strip them of immunity. This case serves as a strong precedent for defendants in § 1983 litigation, emphasizing that general legal principles are insufficient; plaintiffs must point to specific, factually similar cases to defeat a qualified immunity defense.
