Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.
414 U.S. 86, 38 L. Ed. 2d 287, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 175 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's refusal to hire an individual based on their lack of U.S. citizenship does not, by itself, constitute discrimination on the basis of "national origin" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unless the policy is a pretext for, or has the effect of, discriminating against a particular national origin.
Facts:
- Cecilia Espinoza, a citizen of Mexico, was a lawfully admitted resident alien living in San Antonio, Texas with her husband, a U.S. citizen.
- In July 1969, Espinoza applied for a position as a seamstress at Farah Manufacturing Co.'s San Antonio division.
- Farah Manufacturing Co. maintained a longstanding company policy against employing non-U.S. citizens.
- Espinoza's employment application was rejected solely on the basis of this policy against hiring aliens.
- At the time, over 96% of the employees at Farah's San Antonio division were of Mexican ancestry.
- The individual ultimately hired for the position Espinoza sought was a U.S. citizen with a Spanish surname.
Procedural Posture:
- Cecilia Espinoza filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- After exhausting administrative remedies, Espinoza sued Farah Manufacturing Co. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.
- The District Court, a trial court, granted summary judgment in favor of Espinoza.
- Farah Manufacturing Co. appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the district court's judgment, finding for Farah.
- Espinoza successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the appellate court's decision.
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Issue:
Does an employer's policy of refusing to hire non-U.S. citizens constitute discrimination on the basis of "national origin" in violation of § 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
No. A refusal to hire based on citizenship status is not equivalent to discrimination based on national origin under Title VII. The term "national origin" refers to the country where a person or their ancestors were born, not their legal status as a citizen. The Court reasoned that the plain language of the statute and its legislative history support this distinction, with legislative debate defining national origin as 'the country from which you or your forebears came.' Furthermore, Congress itself has historically required citizenship for most federal employment, even while prohibiting national origin discrimination, indicating it did not view the two as synonymous. While an employer cannot use a citizenship requirement as a pretext for national origin discrimination, there was no evidence of such purpose or effect here, as Farah's workforce was overwhelmingly of Mexican origin.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. Discrimination based on alienage is de facto discrimination based on national origin. The dissent argues that alienage results from the sole condition of being born outside the United States, making a policy against hiring aliens inherently a policy that prefers those born in this country. Citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the dissent contends that a facially neutral policy like a citizenship requirement, which has a discriminatory effect and is not related to job performance, is unlawful. The dissent concludes that the majority's narrow construction of the statute is contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation and undermines the broad congressional policy of removing arbitrary barriers to employment for vulnerable groups like immigrants.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of "national origin" protection under Title VII by distinguishing it from citizenship status. It established that alienage discrimination is not, per se, a violation of the statute. Consequently, the ruling places a higher burden on plaintiffs, who must now demonstrate that a citizenship requirement is not merely a neutral policy but is either a pretext for intentional discrimination against a specific nationality or has a disparate impact on that group. This case carved out a major exception to Title VII's protections, affecting millions of non-citizen workers and affirming the legality of 'citizens-only' hiring policies in the private sector, provided they do not function as a proxy for national origin bias.
