Escobedo v. Illinois
378 U.S. 478 (1964)
Rule of Law:
When a police investigation shifts from a general inquiry to focusing on a particular suspect in custody, the suspect has a Sixth Amendment right to consult with their attorney, and any incriminating statement elicited by police during interrogation after denying the suspect's request for counsel is inadmissible at trial.
Facts:
- On January 19, 1960, Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law was fatally shot.
- Escobedo was first arrested on January 20, retained a lawyer, made no statement, and was released.
- On January 30, another suspect in custody, Benedict DiGerlando, told police that Escobedo had fired the fatal shots.
- That same evening, police arrested Escobedo and his sister. En route to the station, police informed Escobedo that DiGerlando had implicated him.
- Escobedo told the officers he wanted to speak with his lawyer.
- Shortly after Escobedo arrived at the police station, his retained lawyer also arrived and repeatedly asked to see his client, but police denied all requests for several hours.
- During the interrogation, Escobedo repeatedly asked to speak with his lawyer, but police refused and told him his lawyer 'didn't want to see' him.
- Without being advised of his right to remain silent, Escobedo was interrogated for hours and eventually made incriminating statements after a confrontation with DiGerlando.
Procedural Posture:
- Danny Escobedo's incriminating statement was admitted into evidence at his trial in an Illinois state court.
- Escobedo's motions to suppress the statement, made before and during the trial, were denied.
- Escobedo was convicted of murder.
- Escobedo appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
- The Illinois Supreme Court initially reversed the conviction, holding the statement was inadmissible.
- The State of Illinois petitioned for a rehearing, which the court granted.
- Upon rehearing, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated its prior opinion and affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the refusal by police to honor a suspect's request to consult with his lawyer during a custodial interrogation, when the investigation has focused on that suspect, violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Goldberg
Yes. When a police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect in custody, the suspect has been denied the Assistance of Counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment if police deny the suspect's request to consult with his lawyer and have not effectively warned him of his absolute right to remain silent. The Court reasoned that at this 'accusatory' stage, the adversary system begins to operate, and denying counsel renders the subsequent trial a mere formality since a conviction may already be secured. To make the right to counsel dependent on a formal indictment would exalt form over substance, as the pre-indictment interrogation is a critical stage where legal advice is essential to protect the suspect's rights, particularly the privilege against self-incrimination.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. The Court's decision creates a new, unworkable constitutional right that moves the attachment of the right to counsel back from the date of indictment to the moment the prosecution begins to 'focus' on the accused. This ruling effectively creates an impenetrable barrier to any police interrogation of a suspect, which is a departure from the established 'voluntary-involuntary' test for the admissibility of confessions under the Fifth Amendment. The majority's rule is not supported by the Constitution, which only proscribes compelled self-incrimination, not voluntary disclosures, and will seriously cripple legitimate law enforcement efforts.
Dissenting - Justice Stewart
No. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of formal judicial proceedings, such as an indictment or arraignment, which marks the transition from investigation to an adversary proceeding. This case involved a pre-indictment police investigation of an unsolved murder, distinguishing it from cases like Massiah v. United States where proceedings had already begun. By applying trial-related constitutional guarantees to a routine police investigation, the Court perverts those guarantees and frustrates the vital interests of society in effective law enforcement.
Analysis:
Escobedo v. Illinois was a landmark decision that extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the pre-indictment custodial interrogation stage, significantly shifting constitutional criminal procedure. It established the 'accusatory stage' as a critical point where constitutional protections attach, moving beyond the traditional due process 'voluntariness' test for confessions. This case served as a crucial stepping stone to the more comprehensive protections established two years later in Miranda v. Arizona, which mandated specific warnings about the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. The decision underscored the Court's growing concern that the interrogation room was a site of significant potential for constitutional violations and that legal counsel was necessary to level the playing field between the individual and the state.
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