Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
304 U.S. 64 (1938)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, federal courts must apply the substantive law of the state, including the common law as declared by the state's highest court, and not a 'general federal common law.'
Facts:
- Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was walking along a commonly used footpath on the right-of-way of the Erie Railroad Company in Hughestown, Pennsylvania.
- The Erie Railroad Company is a corporation of New York.
- While walking on a dark night, Tompkins was struck and severely injured by an object, which he claimed was a door projecting from a passing freight train.
- Tompkins alleged the railroad was negligent, while the railroad argued he was a trespasser.
- Under Pennsylvania's common law, as Erie Railroad contended, individuals using such longitudinal pathways are considered trespassers to whom the railroad owes only a duty to refrain from willful or wanton injury.
- There was no Pennsylvania statute governing a railroad's duty of care to individuals using pathways on its right-of-way.
Procedural Posture:
- Tompkins sued Erie Railroad Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction.
- At trial, the judge refused Erie's request to apply Pennsylvania common law and instead applied 'general law.'
- A jury found for Tompkins and awarded him $30,000; the District Court entered judgment on the verdict.
- Erie Railroad Company, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the question of liability was one of 'general law,' where federal courts were free to exercise their independent judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Erie Railroad Company's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a diversity of citizenship case, must a federal court apply the substantive common law of the state where the incident occurred, thereby overturning the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson which allowed for the application of a 'general federal common law'?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brandeis
Yes. Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. The long-standing doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, which allowed federal courts to apply a 'general common law' in diversity cases, is overruled as an unconstitutional assumption of power. Historical research revealed that the Rules of Decision Act of 1789 was misinterpreted and that 'the laws of the several states' was intended to include state common law. The Swift doctrine created grave discrimination by allowing non-citizens to access a different body of law than citizens, preventing uniformity of law within a state and violating principles of federalism. There is no 'federal general common law,' as neither Congress nor the federal courts have the constitutional power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Butler
No. The Court should not have overturned the century-old doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, especially when the constitutional question was neither raised by the parties nor argued before the Court. The Court's decision to radically change a rule of decision in force since the foundation of the government without appropriate deliberation is an improvident use of judicial power. This case could have been decided on the narrower questions of negligence and contributory negligence that were presented by the parties. By striking down the established rule on constitutional grounds, the court is divesting Congress of power and creating uncertainty across a broad field of law, rendering countless federal decisions non-authoritative.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Reed
Yes. While the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should be disapproved, the decision should rest on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds. The Court should simply declare that the interpretation of 'the laws' in the Judiciary Act of 1789 in Swift v. Tyson was erroneous and that the phrase does include state common law. Declaring the previous course of the federal courts 'unconstitutional' is unnecessary and raises questionable doubts about Congress's power to legislate rules of decision for federal courts. It is preferable to overturn an established construction of a statute than to make a constitutional ruling when the case does not require it.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally reshaped American federalism and civil procedure by establishing the 'Erie doctrine.' By abolishing the concept of a general federal common law in diversity cases, the Court sought to ensure that the outcome of litigation would be the same in federal court as it would be in the state court of the state where the events occurred. This prevents 'forum shopping' by out-of-state litigants seeking more favorable federal rules and ensures that state law, as articulated by state courts, governs the substantive rights of individuals within that state. The decision mandates that federal courts distinguish between substantive law, where state law applies, and procedural law, where federal rules govern.
