Erickson v. Christenson
781 P.2d 383, 99 Or. App. 104 (1989)
Rule of Law:
Claims for breach of a confidential pastoral relationship and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arising from sexual abuse by clergy, are not barred by the abolished tort of seduction or the First Amendment, and religious organizations may be held vicariously and directly liable for such misconduct.
Facts:
- In 1970, when F.G. was 13 years old, Pastor Christenson established a confidential relationship with her, acting as her pastor, counselor, confessor, advisor, friend, teacher, and surrogate father.
- Christenson mentally manipulated F.G. to become dependent upon him.
- Christenson coerced and manipulated F.G. to have close contact and sexual relations with him for his own purposes.
- Christenson continued to exercise dominion and control over F.G. until the fall or winter of 1986 and attempted to manipulate the relationship until May 1987.
- Luther Memorial, Christenson's employer, knew or should have known that Christenson was not adequately trained as a counselor and had misused his position in the past to take advantage of parishioners and counseled persons.
- After F.G. initiated a church complaint against Christenson, ALC-NPD undertook the role of her advocate and counselor.
- ALC-NPD required F.G. to proceed through a confrontational process to have Christenson removed, even after he voluntarily admitted to a sexual dependency unit, and continued to require her to confront the church congregation.
- As a result of Christenson’s misuse of his position, F.G. suffered sexual abuse, extreme emotional distress, physical illness, loss of sleep and memory, clinical depression, and loss in her ability to trust other adults, authority, and deal with religion and her faith in God.
Procedural Posture:
- F.G. brought an action against her pastor, Bryan Christenson, his employer Luther Memorial, and the American Lutheran Church, North Pacific District (ALC-NPD) in a trial court.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motions under ORCP 21A to dismiss for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to state claims.
- F.G. appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Court of Appeals of Oregon.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff state valid claims for breach of a confidential relationship, intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, and vicarious/direct negligence against a pastor and religious organizations for sexual abuse within a pastoral counseling relationship, or are such claims barred by the abolished tort of seduction or the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Rossman, J.
Yes, a plaintiff states valid claims for breach of a confidential relationship, intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, and vicarious/direct negligence against a pastor and religious organizations for sexual abuse within a pastoral counseling relationship, and such claims are not barred by the abolished tort of seduction or the First Amendment. The court distinguished F.G.'s claims from the abolished tort of seduction (Or Laws 1973, ch 640), noting that seduction focused on damage to character and reputation, whereas F.G.'s claims alleged harm stemming from the misuse of a position of trust, causing emotional distress, physical illness, and loss of ability to trust. The court referenced Spiess v. Johnson to show that the nature of the loss distinguishes the claims. The confidential relationship itself is relevant to the degree of culpability and outrageousness for intentional infliction of emotional distress (citing Hall v. The May Dept. Stores and Torgeson v. Connor). Christenson's First Amendment arguments were deemed premature and a misconstruction of the claims; the claims were based on abuse of a special trust, not an examination of religious beliefs or a penalty for being a pastor. For claims against Luther Memorial, the court found F.G. sufficiently alleged vicarious liability under respondeat superior (citing Chesterman v. Barmon) because the alleged wrongful act (improper pastoral counseling) could be considered within the scope of employment. F.G. also stated a claim for negligent supervision, alleging Luther Memorial knew or should have known of Christenson's inadequate training and past misconduct, creating a foreseeable risk of harm (citing Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J). Claims against ALC-NPD for negligent supervision were also sufficient, as questions of capacity or statute of limitations were premature. Finally, F.G.'s claim that ALC-NPD's handling of her church complaint (requiring a confrontational process) unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of harm also stated a claim for simple negligence under Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying that claims for abuse of a confidential pastoral relationship and resulting emotional distress are distinct from abolished torts like seduction, emphasizing the unique trust inherent in such relationships. It broadens the potential liability for religious organizations under `respondeat superior` and negligent supervision doctrines for the misconduct of their clergy. Crucially, it limits the use of First Amendment defenses as a basis for dismissal at the pleading stage, allowing such claims to proceed to discovery and trial. This ruling ensures that victims of clergy abuse have a viable legal recourse and holds religious institutions accountable for protecting their congregants by allowing these claims to be litigated on their merits.
